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Executive Summary 
This survey examines the framework conditions of civil society in Austria. It was conducted at the 
Institute for Sociology and Empirical Social Research at WU. It builds on two previous surveys on the 
same topic, a Civil Society Index Rapid Assessment (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014) and an update of this 
Assessment (Simsa et al., 2019).  
In 2014, the development of public and private funding, democratic rights and performance of civil 
society organisations (CSOs) were particularly important; in 2019, the focus was on the impact on civil 
society of authoritarian policies. The current survey initially focused on an analysis of the impact of the 
change to a more civil-society friendly government at the beginning of 2020. In the course of the year, 
the effects of the Covid-19 crisis came to the fore.  
By civil society we refer to the sphere between the state, the economy and the private sphere, in which 
people collectively represent and try to shape their own concerns (Simsa, 2013). Civil society and its 
organisations have high benefits for society. In addition to producing services for the common good, 
they also strengthen diversity, participation and integration. The importance of a pluralistic civil society 
for democracy is undisputed. Democracy thus needs civil society, but civil society is not necessarily 
democratic. In the last year in particular, illiberal civil-society endeavours have also gained in 
importance, especially based on conspiracy-theories. Nevertheless, these were only a marginal topic in 
the present survey. Rather, in the tradition of previous surveys, the report focuses on those areas of civil 
society that meet Habermas´ requirements of plurality, tolerance and discursivity (Habermas, 1992). 
Political framework conditions are decisive for the functioning of civil society in many respects. Apart 
from general human rights such as freedom of association or freedom of expression, opportunities for 
participation in legislative procedures, the government's information policy, and the quality of the 
welfare state and the financial support of civil society organisations by the public sector play an 
important role. Following on from the 2019 study, the following topics will therefore be analysed: 
• The social climate in relation to civil society 
• Participation, i.e. political involvement of civil society 
• Funding of civil society organisations 
• The human rights situation 
While in 2019 a very homogeneous picture was drawn by respondents, currently the impressions and 
findings are highly diverse. Some respondents complain about the lack of dialogue with politicians, 
while others see it as much better and more intense than in 2019. The situation is similar with 
participation as well as with regard to the financial situation.  
It is a clear result that the general climate with regard to civil society has improved. There is hardly any 
devaluation or defamation on the part of politicians. The pan-demy has also made clear the high 
importance of services provided by civil society organisations, which are therefore increasingly 
appreciated. Currently, many respondents also perceive a better discourse with politicians, although 
there are major differences in the perception of the two governing parties in this respect.  
However, the improved climate and the communication that is now partly possible again has shown 
little effect on the possibilities of political participation. In the health and social sectors as well as in 
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climate policy, the expertise of CSOs is explicitly requested by politicians and partly taken into account, 
but according to the respondents there is little participation in other areas. It is interesting that the 
situation in this regard has changed only slightly since 2019, but that civil society currently seems to 
accept this more than before. Firstly, this can be attributed to the pandemic. Especially in the first 
months of the crisis, there was more acceptance of quick, less inclusive and less transparent decisions 
due to the high level of uncertainty. Furthermore, during this time, organisations in the health or care 
sector were stretched to the limit in coping with the greatly increased work demands, leaving less time 
for advocacy or criticism.  
Secondly, the participation of the Green Party in government also has an impact on the critical potential. 
On the one hand, there is a certain “inhibition to bite” on the part of some CSOs due to political or 
personal proximity, and there is also increased participation in the Green-led ministries. On the other 
hand, however, the criticism of politics, for example of asylum policy, is more severe because 
expectations have been disappointed. As the pandemic progressed, however, deficits in participation 
became clearer and more strongly criticised. The shortening of review periods, for example, which 
limited the possibility of comments, transparency and trust, could no longer be argued with the urgency 
of the decisions.  
The Covid-19 pandemic is associated with severe restrictions on both fundamental and human rights 
and civil liberties. Exit restrictions and stand-off rules also affect freedom of assembly. In this respect, 
there was a difficult situation in 2021. On the one hand, events were restricted at the beginning of the 
pandemic with reference to the health situation, which was criticised by civil society. On the other hand, 
however, a series of large demonstrations against the pandemic measures, some of which were banned, 
took place towards the end of 2020 and in 2021 with the participation of radical right-wing groups, which 
showed a high degree of willingness to use violence and whose participants in some cases did not 
comply with the pandemic regulations. 
Regarding the financial situation of CSOs the previously seen politically motivated cuts in public funding 
for critical CSOs were no longer seen. However, the cuts made in 2018/2019 had hardly been reversed. 
A decisive factor regarding the public funding of CSOs was the Nonprofit-emergency fund of 700 million 
euros decided in June, which had contributed significantly to providing financial security for many of 
the CSOs. 
In terms of policy content, hopes of civil society were disappointed, especially for improvements in 
asylum, ecological and social welfare legislation. The last year was dominated by COVID-19 and the 
handling of the pandemic, leading to the postponement of other agendas important for the future.  
The COVID-19 pandemic and the actions of the federal government posed many challenges to civil 
society and CSOs and caused considerable strain on their actors. It is to be hoped that the projects 
planned by the government (e.g. initiatives for voluntary work in 2021) will be taken up and that 
expenditures for absorbing the side effects of the pandemic will not be sacrificed to a new austerity 
course at the expense of the CSOs. Also, a new awareness of the importance of freedom and assembly 
rights has grown in many sectors of society. This can lead to an increase in the importance of CSOs in 
the post-pandemic period, if more people can be mobilised for their causes.  
The methodological basis of this survey was firstly a literature and document analysis. Secondly, a total 
of 27 interviews with representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs) were conducted between 
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1. Context: Developments of the Civil Society in Austria 
Socio-economic and historic framework  
Political and social framework conditions are crucial for the functioning of civil society. Specifically im-
portant are general human and civil rights such as freedom of association or freedom of expression, 
opportunities for participation in legislative procedures, the government's information policy, the qual-
ity of the welfare state and the public financial support of civil society organisations. An empirical study 
in eight European countries shows that civil society organisations (CSOs) are significantly more resilient 
if there are conducive conditions in the respective country and, above all, good cooperation with the 
state (Pape et al., 2019). 
Austria offers a good illustration of the interplay between civil society and politics as has experienced 
disruptive changes in the political landscape in recent years. After decades of relatively good coopera-
tion of politics with a part of CSOs, especially in the context of welfare state arrangements, as well as a 
generally high level of civil society participation, a governing coalition assessed as right-wing populist 
brought about massive changes in the social climate, in the possibilities of civil society participation and 
in the economic situation of critical organisations within a short period of time. These changes were 
empirically surveyed and analysed and largely followed the pattern known from countries with author-
itarian politics (Simsa, 2020). The present follow-up study was now to ascertain how a change of gov-
ernment to a coalition seen as more “civil society-friendly”, with the participation of the Greens and 
without the participation of the strongly right-wing populist FPÖ, would affect this situation. However, 
this question was overshadowed by developments around the Covid pandemic from March 2020 on-
wards. In the following, we will explore the impact of both the political change and the health crisis on 
civil society. 
1.1. Development and significance of civil society in Austria 
The socio-economic and historic framework is quite stable. In recent decades, Austria has had a rela-
tively strong economy, a developed welfare system and a stable democracy. Civil society and civil soci-
ety organisations (CSOs) are a vital part of the country. CSOs are valued in welfare state arrangements – 
there is a high degree of social stability and quite good relations between government and CSOs (More-
Hollerweger et al., 2014).  
CSOs in Austria are deeply involved in political decision-making. CSOs have engaged in dialogue and 
negotiations with the government in many areas and have often been involved in legislative processes. 
Further, they provide social services and in return, they receive large shares of their funding from public 
sources. The public sector thus plays an important role for CSOs, influencing their organisational and 
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financial structures. CSOs are particularly active in social services, health care and education. Further-
more, federalism and self-governance of the nine federal provinces are reflected in civil society and 
there are both strong local and umbrella organisations at the federal level. 
Social movements, particularly workers’, women’s and environmental movements have long traditions 
and in the past few decades they have increasingly sought cooperation. This means Austria can be de-
scribed as a consensus democracy (Dolezal & Hutter, 2007). 
Economisation and economic insecurities 
Nevertheless, in recent years, conditions for civil society organisations have deteriorated. Relations be-
tween the public sector and CSOs have changed in the last two decades. There has been a shift towards 
more neoliberal ideologies (Zimmer, 2014). Neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatisation of so-
cial tasks have been implemented in Austria, although these have been mitigated by a comparatively 
good welfare state. In a Delphi Study, Austrian experts expected a further decrease in public funding in 
relation to demand, putting pressure on CSOs to diversify and to engage in new income-generating ac-
tivities (Neumayr et al., 2017). With the shift towards new public management, CSOs have lost their priv-
ileged position in welfare state arrangements. Quasi-markets have increased controlling and account-
ability mechanisms. Competitive tendering procedures have been opened up to commercial providers 
and their share of the market has been rising in the last decade. 
Alongside these changes there has been a decrease in public funding, especially after the global finan-
cial crisis in the late 2000s (Pape et al., 2019). A study of the financial situation of Austrian CSOs in 2015 
showed that public funding had become more unstable leading to more challenges for these organisa-
tions (Simsa, 2015).  
With the pressure to implement austerity policies and to increase competitiveness through wage cuts, 
flexibilisation of labour markets and the reduction of public (social) expenditure, social inequalities also 
became increasingly acute in Austria (Fellner & Grisold, 2010; Marterbauer, 2011).  
Thus, those CSOs that are financed by public funds faced increased economic pressure. The logic of the 
economy, market-based structures and competition also gained importance in the nonprofit sector. In 
more and more areas, the tension between mission and market (Sanders, 2015) seems to be dissolved 
in favour of the market logic (Maier & Meyer, 2011).  
Even though the image of civil society remained high in the eyes of the population and CSOs enjoyed a 
high level of trust (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014), it seemed that the value of organisations or behaviours 
that did not conform to economic calculations tended to decline (Liebig, 2005).  
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The increase of right-wing populist attitudes and politics  
In recent years, there has been some turbulence in politics and civil society in Austria. Civil society in-
volvement increased dramatically in the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/2016. Civil society actors played 
an important role in maintaining humanitarian standards and in crisis management (Simsa, 2017), 
against a background of increasing political polarisation around the issue of immigration. The 2017 Na-
tional Council election led to a coalition between the conservatives (ÖVP) and the right-wing national 
conservatives (FPÖ), both of which had run a polarising election campaign strongly focused on the ref-
ugee issue. Although the country has a strong social-democratic tradition, this is also true for right-wing 
populism, with the FPÖ party clearly having right-wing extremist roots (Pelinka, 2019). The Social Dem-
ocratic Party had supported neoliberal policies for decades, but it lost its core electorate as the refugee 
crisis created a clear shift to right-wing populist parties. This culminated in a coalition of the ÖVP and 
the FPÖ in 2017. This government presented simple solutions to all kinds of social and economic prob-
lems and represented exclusive concepts of solidarity (Hofmann et al., 2019). Further, it also espoused 
what might be described as “anti-elite rhetoric” (Pelinka, 2019). An analysis of the impact on civil society 
clearly showed that this government also developed clear authoritarian strategies (Simsa, 2020). 
The impact of these changes was visible in the public discourse, where CSOs were faced with attempts 
to undermine and delegitimise them and also with increased polarisation across society. Furthermore, 
communication between political actors and CSOs decreased, which limited the possibilities for CSOs 
to participate in the legislative processes. It also affected access to financial resources, especially for 
CSOs working in fields that conflicted with the government’s agenda.  
The term populism refers to politics that appeal to simple, archaic forms of identification (Mouffe, 2005) 
and polarization of society between the people and its other, suggesting simplified solutions (Panizza, 
2005). Right-wing populism refers to populism that is ethically, religiously or nationally exclusive 
(Pelinka, 2013). Right-wing populist parties show nationalism and racism (Loch & Norocel, 2015), and 
combine ethno-nationalist xenophobia with an anti‐political‐establishment-rhetoric (Rydgren, 2005). 
They often attempt to destabilize institutions, adopt aggressive narratives, and systematically try to 
weaken protest and critique. Often, they go along with distinct anti-welfare social policies (Bozóki, 
2015). 
Right-wing populism is related to authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is defined as anti-democratic, il-
liberal politics with a decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy, with fewer op-
portunities for opposition (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2018), and with a dominance of the government over 
society (Bozóki, 2015). Many authors stress the anti-pluralistic character of right-wing populism (Mudde, 
2004; Müller, 2017; Urbinati, 2016) and its proximity to autocratic procedures (Weyland, 2018).  
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Modern forms of authoritarianism try to secure their power by restricting civil society (Lührmann & 
Lindberg, 2018). They use complex methods to strategically influence, control and incorporate civil so-
ciety (Froissart, 2014; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2018; Greskovits, 2015), try to usurp the autonomy of the civil 
sphere (Gerő & Kopper, 2013) or to capture it (Kover, 2015).  
Effects of of right-wing populism on civil society 
During the period of the coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ, between the end of 2017 and May 2019, the condi-
tions for the critical parts of civil society deteriorated. There was a clear polarisation of the discourse, 
attempts at targeted intimidation, as well as an increasing delegitimisation of civil society activities in 
the media and by politicians. Delegitimisation of civil society activities took place, for example, through 
the insinuation of profit interests, devaluation of their work, and also the increase of a generally nega-
tive, exclusionary rhetoric. 
With regard to democracy and participation, CSOs were largely and systematically excluded from legis-
lative processes. Review periods were shortened to prevent comments, etc. Politics had become more 
intransparent and hardly communicated with civil society actors. In our empirical study in this period, 
a large number of feedbacks from civil society revealed a systematic strategy to exclude civil society 
from political decisions. Most respondents reported that CSOs were rarely given attention anymore, that 
it was often extremely difficult to maintain a dialogue or get any reactions from politics.  
Basic rights are well developed in Austria in international comparison. However, freedom of assembly 
was restricted in the years before 2019, especially through the extension of the notification period for 
demonstrations and the establishment of so-called protected areas in which assemblies were not al-
lowed. Increasing bureaucratisation and restrictions on legal certainty in practice had an indirect effect 
on the exercise of fundamental rights. 
Regarding public funding, the total expenditures for CSOs had not much had changed between 2014 
and 2019. However, a detailed look shows that there were changes in funding that obviously affected 
critical CSOs. Especially in the areas of migration, arts, women's, labour market and development pol-
icy, these CSOs experienced severe restrictions on public funding. They posed an existential threat to 
many critical organizations and created general fear in the sector (Simsa, 2020). A representative of CSOs 
explained: “This is, so to speak, a lever, so how do I take the money from them, how do I cut it, so that I 
silence these voices (...) either because I cut them completely off or they no longer exist, or because, 
under threat of cuts, I silence them.” (R09, Simsa et al., 2019). 
The changes as a whole showed a clear pattern: they corresponded to the processes of the development 
of authoritarian governments known from the literature (Moder & Pranzl, 2019). Although Austria is a 
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basically liberal democracy with well-developed human rights, there were clearly observable tenden-
cies to limit the critical potential of civil society as well as its participation in political decision-making 
processes. Politically motivated funding decisions have always existed, as have different views on de-
sired participation and conflicts over content between politics and civil society. However, the policy of 
systematically restricting dissent, protest and diversity through a wide variety of interlocking measures 
contradicts the Austrian tradition. It was an expression of an increasingly authoritarian, right-wing pop-
ulist policy. 
1.2. The current political situation – the coalition of ÖVP and the Green Party 
After some severe political scandals, the coalition of 2018 was dissolved after a transitional government, 
a coalition between the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the Greens was formed in January 2020. This 
new federal government was associated with great expectations on the part of civil society representa-
tives. In Austria, there are traditionally good personal contacts and similar political positions between 
civil society and the Green Party.  
On 2 November 2020, Austria was shaken by a terrorist attack that briefly pushed the pandemic into the 
background and shook many people. Apart from much critique regarding political failures in the fight 
against terrorism. Apparently, the authorities had information on the assassin but did not use them due 
to a lack of coordination. Nevertheless, a newly proposed legislative initiative to protect against terror-
ism has been criticised because of the planned restriction of fundamental rights.1  
With the beginning of 2021, the political situation became very unstable again. The Minister of Finance 
was investigated on suspicion of corruption by means of a house search, and motions of no confidence 
were brought against the Ministers of Finance, the Interior and of the Economy by the entire opposition. 
In addition to fundamental controversies over policies, this increased tensions in the coalition. The Peo-
ple´s Party reacted to the juristical accusations with increased criticism and attacks on legal institu-
tions, especially on the Public Prosecutor's Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption.2 
Reputable experts in law reacted very critically and alarmed to accusations and derogatory statements 
by representatives of the federal government against the judiciary. They criticised condemnations of 
authorities by government representatives, especially the “exaggerated and inappropriate” criticism of 
the economic and corruption prosecutor by the ÖVP, after the Minister of Finance had become the sub-
ject of their investigations. The public prosecutor's office was accused by party spokespersons and the 
 
1 https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000123667845/viele-kritische-stimmen-zum-geplanten-anti-terror-gesetz (28 January 
2021) 
2 https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000124166802/oevp-und-causa-bluemel-angriff-als-verteidigung (14 February 2021) 
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Federal Chancellor of fatal errors, false assumptions and decisions based on “faulty facts”, all accusa-
tions that were rejected or refuted by lawyers. On several occasions, experts, such as the former Minister 
of Justice, have expressed surprise and criticism about the Chancellor's understanding of the rule of law 
and the organs of the judiciary. These sweeping and mostly untenable attempts to delegitimise a legal 
authority bear the danger of weakening the population's trust in the rule of law. 
Still, satisfaction with democracy is comparatively high in Austria and ranks among the best in an inter-
national comparison (European Social Survey 2018).3 However, since the beginning of the Corona crisis, 
a decline can be observed. Since March 2020, trust in satisfaction with democracy and trust in the federal 
government has been declining, with trust in the government declining more than trust in democracy.4  
Trust in democratic institutions, such as parliament or media, has also fallen slightly.5 
Increasing importance of the climate movement 
In the years preceding the spring of 2020, the climate (justice) movement gained importance in Austria. 
The demonstrations and strikes of the civil society organisation Fridays for Future, which started with 
Greta Thunberg's school strikes, received specifically high participation and media attention. However, 
many other actors, such as the Parents for Future, Scientists for Future, and other organisations like 
Extinction Rebellion and System Change not Climate Change, were also prominent. While in the years 
before, civil society environmental politics was characterised by institutionalised and well-known CSOs, 
some of which had emerged from movements of the late 20th century (Pundy, 1995), a multitude of new 
grassroots initiatives and organisations were now forming. In 2019, a broad alliance of new movement 
organisations and environmental CSOs formed under the title Klimaprotest.at, which provided network-
ing and protest coordination. 
In 2019, the largest climate demonstrations of all times were observed worldwide, and local and supra-
regional climate initiatives were founded everywhere. It is therefore possible to speak of a broad social 
movement. Their goal is a change of course in climate and environmental policy, compliance with the 
1.5°C target of the Paris Climate Agreement and global climate justice. There were also regular large 
demonstrations in Austria, with strikes and protests every Friday for months, partly in the context of 
global climate strikes. For example, on 27 September 2019, between 65,000 and 150,000 people went 
 
3 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ (18 March 2021) 
4 Carolina Plescia, Felix Krejca und Fabian Kalleitner: Die Dynamik der Demokratiezufriedenheit und des Vertrauens in die 
österreichische Bundesregierung während der Covid-19-Pandemie. Corona-Dynamiken – 09.12.2020. https://viecer.uni-
vie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/corona-dynamiken13/ (20 February 2021) 
5 Oliver Rathkolb und Julian Aichholzer: Demokratische Einstellungen in Österreich: Vor und während der Corona-Krise. 
https://viecer.univie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog89/ (20 February 2021) 
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on strike and demonstrated for climate protection throughout Austria. New cooperations in the move-
ment emerged, from selective alliances for specific actions to umbrella organisation structures. 
With the Covid 19 measures, the number of actions decreased significantly, despite many efforts to 
switch to online activities, and the number of activists and their action-oriented groups also decreased. 
The future of the movement is therefore open. 
1.3. The Covid-19 Pandemie 
Since March 2020, the Corona pandemic has had massive impacts on the social and economic devel-
opment in Austria. In February, the first case of the disease became known in the country and the health 
crisis spread rapidly. The pandemic overlapped practically all social areas and topics.  
In order to limit the spread of the disease, three lockdowns were decided between March 2020 and Feb-
ruary 2021, i.e. restrictions on the movement of the population as well as on economic and cultural life 
through the closure of large parts of trade, gastronomy, cultural and sports organisations. This had a 
massive impact on social life and thus also on civil society. Throughout the period, there were re-
strictions on contact. These varied depending on the phase of the pandemic; in some cases, no people 
from outside the household were allowed to meet at all, in others this was relaxed, whereby different 
numbers of people were allowed in each case. Work, club and leisure activities were suspended for long 
periods or shifted to the virtual world.  
The health effects of the pandemic were drastic. By February 2021, there had been over 454,000 cases 
of illness, and 8,386 people had died from or with the disease. In 2020, the excess mortality rate was 
around 10%, with men being more affected (plus 13.7%) than women (plus 8.2%). Life expectancy has 
thus fallen by around half a year in the Corona year 2020 compared to 2019.6  
The socio-economic effects of the crisis are directly relevant for many of the CSOs, as well as indirectly, 
through changes in the living conditions of their clients. For example, the daily life of people in residen-
tial institutions was massively restricted by measures taken in the wake of the Corona pandemic. CSOs 
had to adapt their care and support services accordingly.  
The COVID-19 pandemic and the measures to contain it caused the biggest global recession since the 
Second World War.7 Real gross domestic product was down 7.3% in 2020.8 This had severe effects on 
the labor market. In April 2020, more than 570,000 people were unemployed, more than ever before. 
 
6 Statistik Austria, Pressemitteilung vom 14.1.2021. https://www.statistik.at/web_de/presse/125167.html (22 February 2021) 
7https://www.wifo.ac.at/jart/prj3/wifo/resources/person_dokument/person_dokument.jart?publikation-
sid=65916&mime_type=application/pdf (22 February 2021) 
8 http://wko.at/statistik/prognose/prognose.pdf (22 February 2021) 
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The number declined slightly in succession, but remained consistently far above the pre-crisis level and 
rose again in winter. In January 2021, 535,470 were out of work, the unemployment rate was 11.4%. 
Compared to the same month of the previous year, this was an increase of 31.8%.9 In 2020, the average 
unemployment rate was around 10% (BMSGPK, 2020). 
In addition, a high number of employees were on short-time work (June 2020: 1.37 million, beginning of 
January 2021: 417,000 persons). Short-time work means that employees' working hours are reduced, 
they receive between 80 and 90% of their income, and the additional costs compared to the actual 
working hours are covered by the public sector. 
The government established a Corona aid fund of 15 billion euros for companies to secure operating 
subsidies. Many CSOs were massively affected financially, as significant areas of income were lost during 
the lockdowns, for example due to the cancellation of cultural festivals or fundraising events. This was 
partially cushioned from June 2020 onwards by a specific emergency fund for non-profit organisations 
(see Chapter III.4.). 
The COVID-19 pandemic is associated with severe restrictions on both fundamental and human rights 
and civil liberties. As a consequence, not only the attention for social work of CSOs increased strongly, 
but also their advocacy work for human rights was increasingly valued. 
From 2021 onwards, there was also an increase in civil society activities in connection with the pan-
demic that did not meet the requirements of plurality, tolerance and discursivity. In the context of pro-
tests against the measures to contain the pandemic, there was an increase in the significance of exclu-
sive, illiberal, civil-society protests, partly with the participation of right-wing extremist individuals and 
groups, such as Gottfried Küssel, who was convicted of National Socialist Wiederbetätigung in 2011. 
They spread conspiracy theories and fight against what they perceive as the Corona dictatorship. For 
Germany, there are findings that the protests against the COVID 19 ordinances were infiltrated or “hi-
jacked” by right-wing groups, which subsequently led to an increasing radicalisation of the movement.10 
It can be assumed that in Austria similar processes were going on. 
This relatively new social movement shows a high degree of individual and collective proximity to na-
tionalist, populist and right-wing extremist elites and groups. At the same time, it is characterised by a 
particularly high heterogeneity of supporters and political positions. They are highly polarising, dividing 
society into two antagonistic spheres. Alternative beliefs and attitudes, for example with regard to med-
icine or the perception of authority, play an important role (cf. Nachtwey et al., 2020). Despite the 
 
9 https://de.statista.com/themen/6436/auswirkungen-des-coronavirus-covid-19-auf-die-wirtschaft-in-oesterreich/ (19 March 
2021) 
10 Hummel, 2021 p. 10 
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diversity of individual situations of concern, which are often related to socio-economic causes, there is 
a unification of the fundamental opposition, which is in principle opposed to liberal democracy. A uni-
fying element is thus the scepticism towards parliamentary democracy, the media and social and polit-
ical-economic institutions (cf. Nachtwey et al., 2020). Interestingly, apart from these common features, 
political preferences of activists are very divers.  
Regarding human rights and the question of civic spaces, these protests pose severe challenges. Many 
of their views are not democratic and often participants did not comply with Covid-measures and thus 
threatened others. As a consequence, many of the demonstrations were forbidden, but a significant 
number nevertheless took place (see chapter III.3). 
2. Methods and definitions 
The study is based on two previous projects. In 2014, a Civil Society Index – Rapid Assessment (CSI-RA) 
of framework conditions for civil society was performed in line with CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation, the NPO-Kompetenzzentrum at the university of economics and business and IGO - Inter-
essenvertretung Gemeinnütziger Organisationen (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014). In addition to demo-
cratic, especially legal, framework conditions and the perceptibility of civil society impacts, this would 
involve financial resources, employment and volunteer work, as well as transparency in the awarding of 
service contracts and funding. Between 2018 and 2019, an update of this study was performed, specifi-
cally focusing on effects of the political constellation on civil society (Simsa et al., 2019).  
For this study, accompanying research was carried out in scientific literature as well as in the media and 
social media. Scientific literature from the literature analysis is cited in the text, other sources are noted 
in footnotes.  
The core of the study is a qualitative survey. Between December 2020 and February 2021, a total of 27 
interviews were conducted with representatives of CSOs. The interviews were narrative, which allowed 
for a great deal of openness while taking into account some of the guiding questions (Schütze, 1987). 
The selection of interview partners followed the criteria of theoretical sampling of the grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 2008), i.e. the aim was to achieve a high degree of heterogeneity in the sample with 
regard to the fields of activity and size of the CSOs. In the health and social sector 9, in the advocacy 
sector 10, in the arts and culture sector 3, in the environmental sector 4, in the advocacy sector 2 CSOs 
were interviewed. Some CSOs are active in other areas, and these were assigned to a priority area. All 
representatives of the CSOs were managers. 4 interviewees are executives in umbrella organisations and 
could therefore also give an overview of the entire sector. There were 9 men and 16 women in the sam-
ple. 21 interviews were transcribed, 6 interviews were partially transcribed and coded according to 
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central terms. Three of the interviews were taken from another study in the health and care sector 
(Schweinschwaller, 2021). 
The study focused on the following topics: 
• General climate in relation to civil society; 
• Participation and Democracy 
• Human rights – Fundamental rights, freedom of association and of assembly 
• Financial resources and access to public funds 
Definitions 
In this report, civil society is defined as the sum of actors and actions that have a minimum degree of 
autonomy from the market and the state, that are not profit-oriented and are aimed at shaping political 
processes and/or social living conditions, and that take place within the framework of collective action. 
It is thus about the sphere between the state, the economy and the private sphere in which people rep-
resent and try to shape their own concerns (Simsa, 2013). Similarly, Fioramonti und Thümler see civil 
society as “[...] an open arena of participation, located beyond the fuzzy boundaries of state and market, 
in which different types of individuals, groups, and organizations cooperate or compete for visibility and 
relevance, in the pursuit of collective (though not necessarily shared) political and social goals and ani-
mated by a variety of values and interest.” (Vgl. Fioramonti & Thümler, 2013)  
Eine gegenwärtig gerade an Bedeutung gewinnende Frage, ist jene nach dem normativen Gehalt des 
Begriffs der Zivilgesellschaft. 
The term civil society usually is related with ideas of participation, democracy and social justice (Zimmer 
& Priller, 2007). Thus, civil society actors are expected to act with tolerance, fairness and non-violently 
(vgl. Gosewinkel, 2003). Habermas names the requirements of plurality, tolerance and discursivity 
(Habermas, 1992). Further, democratic civility is important (vgl. Chambers & Kopstein, 2001), important 
values and ethical norms such as human rights or solidarity thus are not only shared within the group 
but within all members of society (vgl. Waghmore & Gorringe, 2021). In spite of these normative views 
on civil society also nationalistic, fundamentalist or even right wing radicalist groups act within civil so-
ciety – which is then called »bad civil society« (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). 
Although the normative positive attributions, such as working for a good, democratic, just society, 
largely correspond to the self-descriptions of civil society actors, it makes sense not to include these 
normative aspects in definitions. Who should be able to determine the existence of tolerance or fairness 
beyond doubt?  
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Based on the most common international definition (Meyer & Simsa, 2013b; Salamon & Anheier, 1992) 
we define CSOs or NPOs as private, non-governmental organisations, with a minimum of formal organ-
ization, self-administration and voluntariness that do not distribute profits to owners or members. 
These organisations are often referred to synonymously as NPOs (non-profit organisations), NGOs (non-
governmental organisations) or CSOs (civil society organisations). This study uses the term CSO. When 
referring to literature or statements in interviews that use the terminology NPO or NGO, we use these 
terms.  
3. Results 
3.1. General climate in relation to civil society 
Improvements regarding the climate due to political changes and the pandemic  
Traditionally, civil society and its organisations have been held in high esteem in Austria. This basic con-
sensus that CSOs do important work and have high significance for society threatened to erode after 
2015, a development that became particularly clear in the 2019 analysis. CSOs were often discredited or 
antagonised, not only by the media but also by the government. The results of the 2019 survey showed 
a clear polarisation of the discourse concerning the general climate. Intimidation and delegitimisation 
of civil society activities could be observed in the media and on the part of politicians. The delegitimisa-
tion of civil society activities took place through the insinuation of profit interests, the devaluation of 
work, and also the increase in a generally negative, exclusionary rhetoric. 
At present, the general climate regarding civil society has clearly improved. Therefore, defamation, 
which was still common in 2019 on the part of the governing parties, is hardly present anymore. This 
systematic discrediting of civil society is also no longer found in the media or in other arenas of public 
discourse. Overall, a positive change in the public discussion and a higher appreciation of the work of 
CSOs are perceived, the interviewees largely agree on this: 
The climate has clearly improved. So at least these direct attacks have stopped. I 16 
(…) what is no longer the case in comparison to the previous government is definitely that 
these direct attacks no longer exist. So this delegitimisation, this criminalisation of civil soci-
ety. I 4 
On the one hand, this is associated with the Covid crisis. Social assistance and social services are again 
increasingly seen as important. Poverty and the risk of poverty have moved more into the centre of so-
ciety’s attention. 
 17 
Well, we have had the impression that the issue of poverty has become much more central to 
society. Whereas in the past, topics such as minimum security and social assistance were 
more important for disadvantaged groups or perhaps the long-term unemployed or people 
with a migration background, what one generally calls marginalised groups in society. Sud-
denly, these have become issues that affect an average Austrian citizen, a single-person busi-
ness, which has lost orders from one day to the next and now has no access to minimum in-
come. I think this has also once again raised awareness of how important this social network 
is. I 23 
On the other hand, the better climate is also attributed to a change in political conditions, i.e. the par-
ticipation of the Greens in government, who are basically positive towards democratic-civil society ac-
tivities and organisations. In addition, there are also many personal contacts and acquaintances. Many 
members of the Greens have worked in civil society organisations or have been active in various move-
ments. 
This access and the ability of dialogue with the government, I think that is already here again. 
Especially, I would say, with the Green-led ministerial posts or cabinets. I 4 
However, it was mentioned that particularly the services provided by CSOs are appreciated, while their 
political work is rather less perceived. 
The improved climate has also tended to benefit the large service organisations, which are considered 
as particularly relevant to the system. 
Because critical infrastructure are primarily those who always operate facilities, who operate 
some kind of service. That's what I mean. And these tend to be the big ones. I 5 
Nevertheless, some of the increased appreciation also goes beyond social service CSOs and includes 
advocacy organisations as well. 
What I already hear from organisations (…) that are not considered critical infrastructure (…), 
is that they nevertheless notice that they are perceived differently again. Because then the 
whole sector is perceived differently. I 5 
In general, it is difficult to attribute experienced changes to specific causes since the pandemic and the 
change of government had taken place almost at the same time. 
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3.1.1. Framework conditions in selected areas of activity 
While the general climate and the funding of many CSOs in the context of Covid emergency aid are con-
sistently described by the interviewees as positive developments, the framework conditions in the re-
spective activities of the CSOs are sometimes seen very critically. In general, these are of course depend-
ent on the respective area, but the basic tenor is that Covid overshadows everything, that there are 
strong deficits in the substantive policy and that in general expectations towards the Greens had been 
higher.  
Overall, there is also great concern regarding social and economic policy. At present, emergency finan-
cial packages are in place. However, their sustainability is not assured, and there are fears that major 
cuts or austerity packages will be enacted in the future, leading to even greater social inequalities. 
(…) that one million-to-billion-euro package after the other is being paid out. Consequently 
no one is clear about how this will actually be financed in the future. That's why there is still a 
real fear of the next austerity package or cutback package. But at the moment, money is being 
shelled out as fast as it can (…). So all of a sudden money is being redistributed. That is a new 
dimension. I 21 
Asylum sector 
With regard to the asylum sector, there are different statements. Some interviewees speak of clear im-
provements since the Greens came to power, others are less positive and recognize the fact that at least 
little further deterioration of the framework conditions has taken place. 
Yes, I can report few positive things, the only positive thing is that there are no more legislative 
proposals that drift in an even more insane direction, as they were constantly produced be-
fore. So there is no such thing, the Greens have obviously made it clear that there is no such 
thing with them. I 10 
Other respondents sharply criticise the policy. In terms of content, not much has changed in the gov-
ernment programme.  
The majority is completely the same. The previous policy of the collation between the People’s 
Party and the Freedom Party are being continued and now elaborated and carried out. I 6 
However, this opinion is not shared by all respondents. In particular, the importance of civil society in 
the current government programme was considered very positively by some. 
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(…) on a positive note, I would like to mention that civil society is also included very positively 
in the government programme and that there really is a programme at all. I 12 
In practice, further cuts are seen in some cases. For example, the nationalisation of legal counselling in 
asylum procedures, formerly carried out by CSOs, is criticised.  
They all actually said: Well, that's not possible. The state cannot do that at the same time un-
der the (…) same ministry, give legal advice and before that issue the negative decisions and 
then fight itself or its own decisions. And that is also unique in Europe. I 10 
They also criticise the fact that the resettlement policy has not changed compared to the previous gov-
ernment, which was heavily criticised for its harsh asylum policy, and the poor living conditions for asy-
lum seekers (for example, due to the lack of valorisation of the basic daily allowance). With the nation-
alisation of legal counselling, a previous field of activity of CSOs has completely disappeared. I 22 
With a focus on refugee work and asylum policy there has been surprisingly little change. Well, 
everything has actually continued unabated. The government programme in the chapter on 
asylum and migration is a complete disaster. I 10 
Looking at the statements as a whole, improvements in this area mainly related to the general climate 
and communication with politicians. CSOs are less attacked for their commitment to refugees and asy-
lum seekers than they were a few years ago. At the same time, however, the restrictive asylum policy is 
experienced as frustrating, especially by volunteers. There again, the Corona pandemic overshadows 
almost everything else. I 12 
On this issue, the different strengths of the two coalition partners become particularly clear. The Aus-
trian People’s Party (ÖVP) is particularly tough on asylum policy. 
 
We hoped that the Greens would contribute to a different perception of these things, but I 
think it was clear relatively soon that the ÖVP would not let the issue of migration, asylum and 
integration out of its hands and would take a very clear and hard line. I 23 
Human rights work 
On the one hand, there have been massive positive changes in human rights work due to the Green 
participation in government. 
(...) they are open when we get in touch. That is already positive. I 12 
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In terms of content, the topic was strongly influenced by measures to prevent the pandemic. Many of 
these have direct or indirect effects on human rights, such as the many direct restrictions on freedom of 
movement and assembly. Indirect effects are economic or social consequences of the measures, which 
could violate economic or social rights.  
The work of CSOs in this area is influenced by two aspects. Firstly, additional, new work is created 
through the observation and analysis of measures and their consequences at home and abroad. Sec-
ondly, however, more support for the issue is perceived, as more people are now affected by potential 
restrictions on their human rights. 
Social services and health sector 
The pandemic had a particularly high impact on CSOs in the health and social sectors. In addition to 
financial constraints and additional costs, there were also challenges in terms of human resources. Mill-
ner and colleagues observe that restrictions due to Covid-19 lead to an increased demand for specific 
social services, which had to be adapted accordingly by the respective CSOs. These organisations also 
reacted to changes caused by the pandemic through the development of new, digital services and the 
utilisation of public funds (Millner et al., 2020). The majority of the social sector was negatively affected. 
Considerable additional costs were incurred for protective measures, which primarily affected smaller 
organisations.  
Now, in the area of care for the homeless, for example, the winter quarters, which are normally 
only open at night, were also opened during the day at very short notice. They had to quickly 
make arrangements with a maximum number of people in rooms, with distances and with 
masks. I 23 
A worrying phenomenon is being observed in in social work. Here, in addition to known groups, new 
target groups such as artists, students or small self-employed people reported precarious situations.  
In the counselling centres, after an initial lull, the number of new contacts, especially initial 
contacts, i.e. people who dock at a social counselling centre for the first time, has risen very 
strongly. I 23 
One of the reasons why the work of social organisations is more appreciated lies in the need among 
groups that were rather atypical before. Poverty and the risk of poverty have become more central to 
society. 
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I do believe that this has become more visible, also because it has not always affected only 
the marginalised groups, but also people who normally do not come to a social counselling 
centre. I 23 
However, the increase in demand has, among other effects of the Corona pandemic, led to an increased 
workload for the staff of social service organisations as well as those in the health sector (see chapter 
5.2.).  
Many organisations also switched their work to more digital offerings as a result of the Corona-related 
policy measures. Respondents criticised the fact that people with disabilities, for example, were given 
little attention in the corresponding public debate. For them and other socially disadvantaged people, 
these changes meant enormous adjustments that were difficult to understand, especially for people 
with learning difficulties. 
There is a tendency for people with disabilities (…) to be neglected in public coverage and in 
legislation. So, unless they are typical disability laws, they tend not to be considered. I 8 
Environmental policy 
Environmental policy is described critically. Although the climate issue receives some attention despite 
Covid, problems of the health and economic system tend to push environmental issues into the back-
ground. 
We have drawn a very bitter balance of the first year. From the point of view of the environ-
mental protection organisation, what has been achieved so far in climate, pesticide and other 
areas from an initially ambitious government programme is, unfortunately, relatively small. I 
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In any case, climate policy has experienced an increase in attention since the movement around Greta 
Thunberg. This topic has also been pushed into the background, but it is one of the few that still receives 
regular attention alongside the pandemic. 
It is been taken up much more. Young people who are now involved in the Fridays for Future 
association are quoted much more often. I 9 
However, as with other issues, environmental CSOs were able to create digital forms of exchange that 
dominated the dialogue in the Covid pandemic (see section 2.4.). 
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Labour market policy  
In labour market policy, some immediate problems have been absorbed by the emergency fund or by 
short-time work. For CSOs in the sector, it is extremely uncertain, given the high unemployment, how 
the framework conditions will continue to develop after the emergency measures expire. 
It is already clear that the demand is exploding, especially in the context of projects with young 
people furthest removed from the labour market. I 23 
Arts and culture sector 
Between the CSOs in the cultural sector and civil society, there was an occasional rapprochement in 
order to stand up together against the coalition government between the Austrian People’s Party and 
the Austrian Freedom Party (ÖVP and FPÖ). The period of the transitional government is described by 
the cultural sector as a standstill, however, a new form of participation was already beginning in the 
government negotiations in autumn 2019, which is characterised by better contacts with politicians:  
So, all of a sudden, the network has really moved into politics with a direct line and has, of 
course, enabled completely different channels of conversation and opened new doors than 
was the case before. I 18 
Certain topics of cultural workers, such as Action Fairness – an action against the precarity of cultural 
workers – found a place in the government agreement as a result of these talks.  
Even though the atmosphere between civil society and the government is described as much better 
than under the previous coalition, and some of the CSOs' demands are reflected in the government 
programme, burdensome measures of the ÖVP-FPÖ government, such as the halving of the funding 
period, are being continued by the new government and not reversed. 
The Corona crisis leads to a sobering picture. With 150,000 jobs and a value added of € 9.8 billion, the 
culture and arts sector is a relevant economic factor, but is particularly badly hit by economic slumps 
because it was the first to be affected by the closures and has been for a very long time. Pitlik and col-
leagues express their concern that the entire arts and culture sector will lose a fourth of their added 
value because of the pandemic (Pitlik et al., 2020). 
Classified as “not systemically relevant”, representatives of the sector felt insufficiently taken into ac-
count at the beginning of the pandemic and their displeasure also caused a member of the government 
to resign. The replacement with an expert in cultural management and public administration reassured 
many in the cultural sector. After this change, there was an increase in Corona aid for artists. The many 
different funds are seen as quite confusing and the funding guidelines as reinforcing inequality: 
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We still have our hands full with advising where to go a if one needs support. But what we can 
see very clearly is that, in my opinion, there is a divide between those who had a reasonably 
regular income before the crisis, from which they could support themselves, and those who 
have always been very precarious. The crisis does not balance this, but exacerbates these in-
equalities. (...). I 18 
Through the increased media coverage of insecure working conditions in the cultural sector, other in-
sights beyond star coverage are becoming visible:  
We have definitely never had so much media attention, which also shows how work is done in 
the sector. And that there are now not only the stars and well-known names, but many more 
who work invisibly in the sector and find working conditions that would not be considered 
acceptable in many other areas. So, there is certainly more sensitivity now and more attention 
has been paid to this in the short term. I 18 
This media attention in turn has an effect on the cultural sector and leads to new solidarity initiatives, 
after a certain desolidarisation effect was noticed at the beginning of the Corona pandemic, which also 
has to do with the high heterogeneity of the field. Although large cultural institutions and small cultural 
projects are equally affected by the closures, their effects are different. 
(...) because in addition to a very commercially oriented, creative economic context, you have 
large, quasi-publicly owned institutions, such as the large federal theatres and federal museums 
or the same at the provincial level. And then you have the independent sector with a lot of lone 
fighters and steep organisations that fight for the preservation of the basic structure in the first 
place. I 18 
However, the duration of the crisis reveals an already well-known side of the cultural sector: a few, 
mainly large cultural organisations have easier access to resources. It is easier for established cultural 
organisations to get resources than for the independent arts scene.  
Likewise, as a result of the Corona crisis, it is feared that subsidies, especially for the independent scene, 
will be reduced and thus, after the crisis, precarity, unpaid engagement and migration from the creative 
sector will increase considerably.  
3.1.2. The civil society in the media 
The media landscape in Austria has some special features: Media corporations are concentrated in the 
hands of comparatively few owners. The tabloid plays an above-average role in an Austrian comparison. 
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The “Kronen Zeitung” has a nationwide reach of 28%, the free paper “Heute” of slightly more than 12%.11 
The public broadcaster (ORF) still dominates due to a late market opening.  
The “Corona Special Media Subsidy” is a one-off aid to cushion the economic impact of the COVID-19 
crisis situation on the revenue situation in the print media sector. It was created by the so-called 4th 
COVID-19 Act12 as an extraordinary support measure for owners of newspapers, magazines and private 
broadcasting. Austrian media companies were thus supported with more than 30 million euros. Criti-
cism was voiced that print media were favoured in relation to online media and that ÖVP-affiliated me-
dia tended to receive more than critical quality newspapers. Two magazines of the ÖVP farmers' asso-
ciation each receive more additional funding than the weekly newspaper “Falter”. The party newspaper 
of the ÖVP Upper Austria, the “OÖ Volksblatt”, receives more than three times as much as the weekly 
and nationwide newspaper “Profil”.13 
Not surprisingly, individual respondents perceive that it has become more difficult to be heard in the 
media with critical views. 
(...) what is almost general political knowledge is that it is no longer very easy to get heard with 
positions critical of the government in many media. I 14 
With regard to civil society's relations with the media, one positive side of the FPÖ’s government partic-
ipation in 2018/2019 is generally highlighted. A common image of the enemy between civil society and 
many journalists has promoted cooperation with the media. 
But I do believe that the good thing about the time with the FPÖ was that we had a common 
enemy with a large part of the journalists. And because of that, we were in the media and they 
were happy to carry you on their hands. The media environment was easier for us when you 
have an enemy out there. I 5 
The reporting on civil society is nevertheless experienced more positively across the board. The achieve-
ments of CSOs tend to be seen and appreciated more in the view of the respondents. 
In fact, the change of government was a turning point for us, as there was suddenly a lot more 
media resonance to be able to put forward our positions, and Corona has given the whole 
thing another massive boost. I 18 
 
11 https://www.media-analyse.at/table/3067 (1 March 2019). 
12 Federal Law Gazette I No. 24/2020 
13 https://kontrast.at/medienfoerderung-pressefoerderung-corona-oesterreich/ (1 March 2019). 
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The Covid crisis generally led to a more positive perception and higher media visibility of certain areas 
of civil society, especially in the field of care, but also in the health sector, homeless assistance, and 
other social issues. I 14 
Aid organisations are certainly more appreciated. And they also appear more often in the me-
dia because they simply support people or SOS Children's Villages, for example, with advice 
on the wire, who are now particularly affected by the Corona crisis. And one also sees the ne-
cessity for charitable commitment. I 14 
So in this Corona period, the media had no stories, because economic life was shut down. 
That also helped us to regain a bit of importance. Because they were happy when they could 
tell stories. I 5 
However, in addition to increased attention in reporting, respondents also noted an improvement in 
cooperation with the media.  
At the same time, however, the quality and trust in In part, it is also a cooperation of a quality, 
to an extent that we did not know before, yes. I 18 
However, one interviewee also expressed criticism in this context because public service media in par-
ticular were taking less time for certain reports. Long reports on civil society issues are therefore no 
longer in demand. I 19 
3.1.3. The public's perception of civil society: the new importance of helping others  
Because of the high visibility of new social problems and the vulnerability of otherwise well-protected 
groups due to the Covid crisis, the public perception of civil society changed. Restrictions on freedom 
of movement due to Covid regulations brought the human rights issue more into focus, the economic 
crisis situation brought the risk of social hardship more into the centre of society and health risks high-
lighted the value of social services. 
In 2019, many respondents noted that the importance of civil society was rather less appreciated. In this 
context, many mentioned the so-called refugee crisis of autumn 2015 as a turning point. While a wave 
of helpfulness and solidarity was still observable in the first months (Simsa et al., 2016), the mood had 
quickly changed.  
For a long time, there was a basic consensus that we need this civil society. It is an important 
corrective. I no longer see this basic consensus in the same form. I 29, interview from 2019 
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So the climate is changing. Helping is no longer “in” at all. I 17, interview from 2019 
With the Covid-19 crisis this basic mood tended to change again. Moreover, it was no longer primarily 
marginalised groups that needed help, but support in solidarity acquired the connotation of “system 
maintenance”. Social and physical vulnerability became clearer to many people, and with it the great 
importance of a social network.  
Those organisations that were present during the crisis were clearly appreciated. 
XX has benefited from its high visibility in the last year due to the lack of other coverage. The 
perception as a system-preserving organisation (keyword: care institutions) has given it a lot 
of popularity at the moment. I 5 
We also did a survey, which is very recent, I don't have the exact figures now, but that there is 
already a strong perception in society that the XX was present and helped in the crisis. I do 
believe that this has become more visible, also because it has not always, so to speak, affected 
only the marginalised groups, but also really, yes, people who normally do not come to a so-
cial counselling centre. I 23 
Individual respondents, however, also perceive contrary trends, with personal concern also limiting the 
willingness to help.  
Oh well, now we are all so affected ourselves and have so much to do with ourselves and now 
we are supposed to take care of others? That's there too, of course. So I don't think the situa-
tion makes it any easier. I 10  
3.2. Democracy and Participation 
Traditionally, Austria has tended to have a good relationship between civil society and politics 
(Pennerstorfer et al., 2013). CSOs were in dialogue with the government in many areas and they were 
often involved in legislative processes. Under the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, this relationship had clearly dete-
riorated, so that great hopes were placed in the change of government. 
3.2.1. The general relationship between politics and civil society 
According to the CSO representatives interviewed, cooperation with politicians has in fact tended to 
improve since the change of government in 2020.  
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While in 2019 many of the interviewees still described negative rhetoric from government members to-
wards civil society and its effects on the social climate, these explicit devaluations or attempts at intim-
idation no longer exist. 
The interviewees largely agree that communication between politics and civil society has improved sig-
nificantly in the last year. In general, the collapse of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was perceived by many as a 
“great relief” (I 20). As a result, the relationship between politics and civil society has improved for many 
respondents, the tone of communication has changed and with the ÖVP-Green government there has 
been a clear improvement in communication. 
Well, it has changed insofar as conversations simply take place. That didn't happen before at 
that time. (...) So you can communicate. And then, of course, you also find out more quickly 
about the limits. (...) It is somehow more democratic. I 6 
Relations have improved, especially with those positions held by the Green government partner. 
(...) we have a good relationship with some government officials of the Green Party, even with 
the Vice-Chancellor's Office. You are called back well, you are contacted independently, we 
also noticed it in some processes we were involved in. I 3 
(...) there are also differences along party borders. If I speak openly, it is much easier with min-
istries governed by the Green Party or with Green ministries than with ministries controlled by 
the Peoples Party. The Ministry of Justice, for example, is inclusive, and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs has had good experiences, even with statements, in contrast to the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, for example. I 12 
With the current government it is completely different. (...) There is simply a basis for discus-
sion with the Green Party. That is the difference. But it doesn't really help much either. (...) we 
as NGOs are also contacted, yes. Or invited, yes. Which was not the case before. (...) even from 
the ÖVP side (...) I recently got an invitation. For a conversation. There’s a change in general 
with the whole government. (...) this has an effect (...) first and foremost on the basis for dis-
cussion. I 6 
Many respondents have problems with representatives of the ÖVP (the People’s Party). 
(...) there are still many people in the Peoples Party, who do not want to have anything to do 
with civil society. They actually think: “We don't need them. They are a nuisance.” I 5 
 28 
In general, human rights and especially anti-discrimination, equality, inclusion: We have less 
contact with politics, with federal ministries and are also less involved. I 19 
Nevertheless, they are also experiencing that civil society is needed in times of crisis and therefore dia-
logue is improving: 
Still, I believe that they have realised that they need a sympathy offensive and that is where 
civil society was simply used to some extent. I 5 
In connection with Covid-19, there were strong and media-effective cooperations between public insti-
tutions and the larger CSOs in the social sector. A much-discussed topic in this context is the possible 
appropriation of civil society by politics. Like “greenwashing”, there are attempts at “social washing”. 
(...) concerning the Austrian vaccination campaign (...) All this time they never needed us. Now 
all of a sudden, they want everyone to join in. Yes, sure, we will support vaccination. But I will 
not be responsible for their bad performance, (...) I think that there is definitely an attempt of 
appropriation, because they see that they are not doing so well in the media. Then they real-
ised that civil society is also quite popular and has quite good values. And then they try to 
utilise this for their own benefit. I 5 
The Red Cross was particularly prominent in its cooperation with the government. The organisation had 
developed an app for tracking the virus early on, which was also called the Red Cross app. A representa-
tive of the Red Cross was very actively involved in many of the government's press conferences. There is 
scepticism concerning this development from other sides of civil society, especially the fear of being 
misused. 
(...) I think the Red Cross campaign is a good example of this. This excessive presentation of 
the Red Cross. At every press conference, xxx stands happily by. When we talk about appropri-
ation, I say that I don't know if that's good for us in the long run. I 5 
Nevertheless, there are also very critical voices regarding the relationship between politics and civil so-
ciety. 
(...) I believe that the previous government acted in a massively repressive way against this 
more progressive social civil society. I believe that this has not been prolonged and acceler-
ated by the fact that the Green Party is now in government and is sending out different signals. 
Nevertheless, I believe (...) that there was and still is the attempt to identify civil society as the 
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enemy. (...) this cannot be attributed to just one government; I rather think that this process 
really goes back decades. I 22 
3.2.2. Possibility of participation in political decisions 
However, the improvement of relations between politics and civil society does not always lead to more 
participation. Some interviewees see a clear improvement compared to the time of the ÖVP-FPÖ coali-
tion. Many examples of involvement in the political process are mentioned, such as the development of 
the so-called NPO fund or measures in the care sector. 
There it was the case that, in terms of participation, ways were suddenly closed that had pre-
viously been open. And that has now changed again. (...) Now we are much more involved 
again. (...) So, there are many examples where we are involved again. I 5 
Nevertheless, there is clear criticism of the limited opportunities for participation and of the content of 
certain political decisions. Some respondents are very disappointed. 
We used to sit in evaluation groups on laws. We gave opinions on draft evaluations. We were 
also asked how the individual statement was meant or whether we could formulate it more 
precisely and such. I no longer experience anything like that. I 19 
The submission of own-initiative motions where no statements can be brought forward is still frequently 
used, as are procedures with a very short review period. 
Very often initiative treaties are introduced into parliament, (...) which eliminates the review 
procedures. That there are very short review periods. These are things that are not entirely 
new. (...) But this is simply being continued. I 19 
The participation of the Green Party in the government makes things easier, but also leads to disap-
pointments. 
(...) that due to the Green participation in government, (...) we are not seen as an enemy, but 
rather as an organisation that is recognised and valued by them (...) that is of course (...) posi-
tive. But the negative thing is that we have the impression that we don't really get any influ-
ence and the dialogue [is] much less developed (...) than I thought. Of course, you can excuse 
a lot, because we are in a pandemic. (...) and yet it seems to me, at least from our expectations, 
that there is too little dialogue work and (...) the effect, where we bring in expertise, is a long 
time coming. I 22 
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It is this Janus-facedness that puts one in a very difficult position. A colleague often speaks of 
frenemies. On the one hand, we now have a counterpart in individual areas who not only has 
an open ear, but who also has a certain closeness and understanding of the civil society sector. 
In other areas for example the asylum policy we see a continuation of what was there before, 
which actually leads to a very ambivalent relationship as to how this can somehow work in 
the overall structure. I 18 
In some areas, apparent participation is criticised because of legal requirements. 
(...) the requirements for participation processes come from the EU level and have to be im-
plemented by the states. (...) This is also strongly felt in the process. This is not the intrinsic 
motivation of the Ministry of Agriculture (...) but they also have requirements that they have to 
meet. And then it is implemented poorly. And the frustration of all those involved, with whom 
I have spoken to, is enormous. (...) No matter what you say, they do as they please. I 21 
Nevertheless, for some respondents the dialogue with politicians is currently “better than ever” (I 20). 
Representatives of CSOs feel heard, there is a perceived genuine interest on the part of politicians as 
well as appreciation of the expertise of civil society. 
The perceived closeness to the Green Party leads to mixed experiences, between relief, disappointment 
and reluctance to criticise.  
I: With the entry of the Green Party into government, have the possibilities of participation 
changed for civil society?  
B: To be honest, no. I don't see that there are any big exchange platforms now, that there are 
citizens' councils or anything else like that. And we are only a small section of organised civil 
society. We continue to do what we have been doing for ten years. I don't see that there would 
be any radical leaps forward now. I 16 
In those areas where there are major discrepancies between the decisions of politicians and the expec-
tations of civil society (such as asylum, poverty, and human rights), the perceived closeness to the Green 
Party in terms of content also brings open criticism. 
(...) (that it) has become a bit more difficult for us to communicate that way. That the issues 
are actually the same. And that nothing has been solved. And that there is not even a solution 
in the government program. (...) And to communicate this drama and this situation is much 
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more difficult with the Green Party in the government. (...) because we have a different rela-
tionship with the Green Party. I 6 
The core message of many statements is that political involvement only takes place to a very limited 
degree. On the one hand, this is attributed to the COVID-19 crisis, but on the other hand also to funda-
mental structures. 
The negative thing is that we have the impression that we don't really get any influence and 
that the dialogue is much less developed, in purely quantitative terms, than I thought it would 
be. I 22 
I think that in a crisis, a lot of decisions are made top down. (...) That is the nature of things. (...) 
I am actually surprised at how few attempts have been made to consciously integrate this in 
the second phase. (...) I think that if you listen to the criticism of the opposition, which strongly 
suggests that the processes are much too short, that the deadlines are too short and so on. I 
must honestly say that either the Green Party are so clumsy, or they care so little. I 5 
There are ongoing exchanges. I don't see that there is any form of structured involvement of 
civil society at the moment. I 16 
It depends heavily on which ministry and which issues are involved. 
I don't have the feeling that it's excessive. But of course, you notice with the Green Party that 
they always have approaches where they already try. (...) And the Green Party is trying to inte-
grate people in a good way. I 5 
We work a lot with the administration of the Climate Ministry. And they have always been sup-
porters of the youth delegate programme for years. So, they make sure that we can go to the 
climate conference, for example. I 9 
Concerning human rights in general and especially anti-discrimination, equality, inclusion: we 
have less contact with politics, with federal ministries and are also less involved. I 19 
When the ÖVP is involved, it is sometimes judged with scepticism. 
With the Peoples Party, you rather have the feeling that they have a bit of a competition about 
who acts as the more well-behaved integrator. And I think they also recognise the value that 
civil society can have for them. And you can see that most prominently in the campaign they 
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did with the Red Cross. And now they want everyone involved in the Austrian vaccination cam-
paign. I 5 
Another problem was the online exchange with politicians. This was experienced as rather forced and 
often unproductive. One limitation of the CSOs' communication with politics, mentioned by several in-
terviewees, was the administrations slow transition to online communication. 
The online transition limited the expression and exchange of opinions in so far that it was slow 
and sometimes no meaningful input could be given, or discourse could not take place suffi-
ciently. I 7 
There is too little involvement of civil society in environmental legislation, care regulations, in addition 
to pandemic containment regulations. Another example is the current establishment of an authority 
concerning complaints about police brutality. This was included in the current government programme 
after long advocacy work by CSOs but is currently being processed entirely without civil society involve-
ment. 
A fundamental problem of participation in Austria, in contrast to other European countries (such as Ger-
many, Norway, Spain, Ireland), is that there is no established framework that ensures, regulates, and 
supports continuous, structured and mandatory interaction with existing platforms of civil society 
agents. Exceptions are the involvement of traditional social partners and the organisation of some spe-
cific topics such as volunteering or inclusion of people with disabilities. While financial support 
measures for CSOs were taken in 2020, there were no corresponding regulations regarding participation. 
Regrettably, virtually nothing is planned to increase the participation of citizens and organised 
civil society in policymaking. Therefore, it will be the task of civil society agents and their plat-
forms to continue to press the government and parliament to introduce such legally binding 
measures. I 24 
I don't have the impression that something structured has been established in any form. If you 
have contacts in the government now it’s because you know people or have always been lob-
bying anyway (...). I 5 
The extent of involvement is also described as depending on the topic and the agents. In the climate 
sector, for example, it is mainly the younger organisations that are heard, especially Fridays for Future.  
Colleagues from Fridays are saying they are continuously invited to meetings with politicians 
and that is nice to hear. (...) But that doesn't mean that they (the politicians, note) take it 
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seriously, because other NGOs, that have been trying to do this for 30 years don't get appoint-
ments. And I think that many politicians simply use it as publicity and say: “Yes, we are now 
meeting with the young people.” I 9 
The extent to which these contacts and discussions make a difference in terms of content is also in 
doubt. 
Well, I wouldn't say that all youth climate organisations benefit from it. It's true that everyone 
wants to talk to young people because it's great. (...) It just looks good on the photo. I 9 
Citizens' Councils 
The Austrian federal government has defined standards for participation for many years and there are 
also many positive examples of citizen participation. Compared to the actual practice in France, Ireland 
or England and other countries, however, little of this has been implemented in Austria.  
I don't see that there are any big exchange platforms, that there are citizens' councils or any-
thing else like that. I 16 
Citizens' assemblies enable citizens, who are selected at random, to participate in a political decision-
making process by jointly answering a question assigned by the public authorities. They are a comple-
ment to representative democracy and advise policy beyond party membership or affiliation to an ad-
vocacy group (Farell et al., 2019).  
This involvement of citizens is seen as an opportunity to strengthen representative democracy and to 
provide good quality advice on complex decisions (Crouch, 2008).  
Citizens' assemblies are a prominent method of deliberative democracy which enjoy increasing interest. 
A standardised selection process of citizens chosen by lot allows for the best possible representation of 
society in terms of age, gender, social class, and regional distribution. Furthermore, the citizens' assem-
blies are moderated and accompanied by experts. The proposals are evaluated and handed over to the 
parliamentary representatives. The participants' satisfaction with the consultation process and the re-
sults is very high (Farell et al., 2019). New social movements such as Extinction Rebellion are also using 
this method to get politicians to act against the climate crisis. 
Restrictions on participation – The pandemic as a participation killer? 
The pandemic has limited political participation by civil society in several aspects. 
 34 
First, the strong thematic focus on Covid is described as a major obstacle to participation. One of the 
key tools of civil society influence is public attention. However, apart from climate, which is also experi-
encing a (relative) thematic boom, it is very difficult to get attention with other issues. 
That was quite fierce competition for topics, of course. Especially in the initial phase of the 
lockdown, the first lockdown of the first Corona crisis. (...) Corona and the crisis are the domi-
nant themes. I 16 
It is rather difficult to make public statements and assessments now, because there was 
simply a lot of focus on Corona and these were not necessarily always areas that affected us 
at the moment. In some cases, yes, but otherwise many developments have come to a stand-
still. I 23 
For us it's more of a visibility problem now that other issues are in the spotlight. I 19 
Secondly, some programs were shortened due to the pandemic. General planning uncertainties and the 
need to react quickly to pressing developments further limited opportunities for participation. 
(...) we also had the impression that the deadlines were shortened, and that people had less 
time to take a stand, even on complex issues. And now, during the Corona period, it was of 
course very prominent (...) was that due to the urgency, in the general chaos or (...) where did 
that come from? I 23 
The access to the ministry is better, the communication is better, but these democratic pro-
cesses are still very shortened. Very quickly, with very little time to give feedback. Now espe-
cially everything that has to do with the COVID crisis and the COVID measures around it. I 5 
However, the high speed in issuing various measures, which was presumably necessary at the begin-
ning, was maintained in the further course of the pandemic without any objective necessity. For the 
update of the regulations in March 2021, after one year of the pandemic, the deadline for inspection and 
comment was set at about 4 days. 
It has to be fast (...) and that of course massively affects the quality of this process. And I think 
you could say now: Okay, with the first lockdown you can still somehow understand that, be-
cause that was a new situation, nobody had a clue. But I think with the second phase now, 
one could have expected something different, also a different form of involving others, that 
didn't happen. I 5 
 35 
Thirdly, there was a lot of reticence on the part of the CSOs, especially at the beginning of the pandemic. 
During this time, the pandemic put criticism into perspective, protests were limited and many CSOs 
voluntarily put their concerns on the back burner.  
Apart from that, I think the strong impression of a health risk led to people saying at the be-
ginning, “Let's swallow everything and maybe not criticise too loudly. It's difficult for every-
one.” That people were a bit (...) more cautious about how critically they judged certain things, 
which then changed later on. I 7 
In some areas of activity, there was a strong increase in participation in the form of contributing exper-
tise due to new kinds of content-related questions. Here, new, complex challenges may have led to more 
involvement of civil society. 
(...) we, as providers of care facilities, facilities for people with disabilities and so on, have been 
contacted again and again about where we perceive problems and so on. The Ministry of So-
cial Affairs is also very interested in the perceptions of civil society. I 23 
3.2.3. Policy communication with civil society and transparency 
Many interviewees mentioned that the transparency of political processes is in need of improvement (I 
14). In some cases, representatives of CSOs receive information through acquaintance with government 
politicians, i.e., an indirect and exclusive form of transparency. 
There is, of course, much easier access to the cabinets for us. In the Ministry of Health as well 
as in the Ministry of Climate Change. But I would also attribute this to overlapping personnel. 
I 21 
Other respondents see a higher transparency of politics, which they attribute to the participation of the 
Green Party in government. 
I think it also helps that the Green Party is in government, because they place great emphasis 
on transparency. They have been criticised for being less transparent than they originally 
promised, but I think they are more transparent than the previous government. And there was 
a consultation process on the Energy Expansion Act. I 9 
However, there is no structural safeguarding of transparent and participatory processes. 
(...) There is also a kind of coordination office in Germany (...). It is very much about transpar-
ency, participation, visibility of organised civil society, for example with this famous “satellite 
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account”, which we would also like to have. (...) We have a lot of catching up to do, and Corona 
has not improved our structural integration that much. I 24 
there are definitely contacts with the government (...) So there is an ongoing exchange. But i 
don't see that there is any form of structured involvement of civil society at the moment. I 16 
The pandemic makes informal contacts at conferences or other meetings more difficult, which before 
could compensate for non-transparent structures to a certain extent.  
(...) that this is also true for Austria, but up to the EU level, I believe that Corona has simply 
made many processes much less transparent. (...) Because you are in a zoom conference, (...) 
you aren’t standing together over a cup of coffee while chatting about this and that (...) that is 
totally missing. I 4 
3.2.4. Digital participation 
Due to the aforementioned restrictions in the Covid pandemic, civil society participation in its tradi-
tional forms was hindered or in many cases impossible. This had an impact on the actions of CSOs, 
which have increasingly shifted to the digital space.  
Regarding internal networking and the recruitment of new activists or members, social networks were 
mentioned by respondents as an essential form of participation during this time. Some, however, criti-
cise the fact that accessibility through this medium is limited. 
And everything is shifted to (...) social media (...). Where a lot is happening anyway. But I think 
that to many people this isn’t visible at all. (...) Only the people who have an affinity to social 
media know about it or are involved in it. I 6 
(...) and now it can be observed that these online exchange possibilities are not used to the 
extent that would actually be desirable. I 7 
The need to reduce physical contact led to the reorganisation of internal processes and thus also com-
plicated many things. 
(...) this is something we have to deal with internally. That we are constantly planning things, 
cancelling them, planning them again, cancelling them again. That we no longer manage to 
create places where members can meet and exchange ideas. Online formats are only suitable 
to a limited extent. That simply has to be said. (...) We had to cancel our general meeting in 
spring and then we did it online. That also led to some disagreements within the organisation. 
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We just had to cancel it again in February, (one always has; note) a certain worry: How good is 
the internal cohesion to be able to act? That is actually what weakens it the most. I 21 
However, one positive aspect of the use of online media was the possibility of transnational exchange, 
which is easier and cheaper with digital means. 
That has already changed a lot, that one suddenly does not (…) only have to invite people 
from Vienna, but can also invite the one person from Berlin for 10 minutes, who could provide 
the best input. This change has already happened a lot and I think it is irreversible for the fu-
ture. I 7 
In addition to the continuation of existing services through other channels, the need for digitalisation 
has also led to the implementation of new services, which have also created new opportunities for par-
ticipation. 
We have created digital volunteer programmes. Simply because we said, we have to pick this 
up somewhere. The willingness to show solidarity was definitely there. And a lot of people 
really got involved. We founded a platform that now includes, I think, 14,000 people who par-
ticipate. (…) It's not just getting a newsletter, but people who are really committed. I 5 
In general, this form of participation works very well. Initially there were teething problems, but now 
especially the better-known CSOs are registering a high number of visitors, a lot of interest and a will-
ingness to get involved. In this context, some respondents reported a higher level of participation and 
more enquiries (I 9) than in the period before the pandemic. 
However, other CSOs, including large and well-known ones, point to a limited mobilisation 
strength, as they can only rely on online mobilisation. I 16 
In terms of advocacy and protest, it depends a lot on visibility in the digital space. There was a need to 
adapt the form of these activities as well. 
For me, this means that I always ask myself how visible civil society is now in the digital space. 
For example, new forms of protest actions are emerging. There are more activities on Insta-
gram and Facebook, and our student groups, for example, are flourishing. Because they can 
use these tools better and they use social media to start great actions in the digital space. I 12 
In the context of online protests, people experimented with new forms of presence.  
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Well, for example (...) there was always a single person (...) standing in front of the Federal 
Chancellery at that time, also with reference to Moria, and they always photographed them-
selves individually there, but then practically strung their photos together and then played 
them on Instagram and Facebook. (...) To show “I am personally affected, and I show my face”. 
You don't have to have all 50 of them there together, but you can experiment with the possi-
bilities. I 12 
In general, however, the effectiveness of advocacy suffers from the distance required during the pan-
demic. 
A limiting factor is that the potential of digital work can only be realised by those CSOs that have a good 
digital infrastructure. Not surprisingly, associations whose target groups or members tend to be older 
point to difficulties with online operations. (I 15) In general, advocacy work suffers from distance, as 
face-to-face events create a better sense of responsibility as well as a better forum for networking. (I 17) 
However, it seems that younger climate organisations also had difficulties in maintaining their activities 
during the pandemic to the same extent as before. Their structures were not yet as consolidated as 
those of more traditional CSOs, and the shift of many meetings to online spaces tended to reduce par-
ticipation. 
(...) the biggest limitation is (...) that we (...) can only mobilise online. Especially the civil society 
youth movement Fridays for Future, as well as the whole climate protests, are suffering from 
this in particular. We managed to hold a climate protest in September. In compliance with all 
the Corona requirements, which was incredibly complicated. It also got a lot of media atten-
tion. But of course, a fraction (...) I think 8,000 or 10,000 people, compared to the 80,000 the 
year before, because of course it restricts the whole public life so massively. I 16 
3.3. Human rights 
Basic rights in Austria are well developed in international comparison. However, freedom of assembly 
has been restricted in recent years, especially through the extension of the notification period for as-
semblies and the establishment of so-called protected areas. Increasing bureaucratisation and a lack of 
legal certainty in practice have an indirect effect on the exercise of fundamental rights. The pandemic 
has posed severe challenges for securing human rights. 
Fundamental rights in Austria are guaranteed in the Constitution. Human and civil rights are generally 
protected (More-Hollerweger et al., 2014). Against the background of this situation, the following focuses 
on changes since 2019. 
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In its report “Human Rights Challenges Persist”, Amnesty International criticises the human rights policy 
of the Austrian government. The recommendations of the United Nations have hardly been imple-
mented. Amnesty International therefore calls on the government in Austria to consistently implement 
progress for people and their rights.14 
Our study shows that in connection with the pandemic, there have been a number of measures with 
questionable effects on human rights. Otherwise, there were hardly any further deteriorations com-
pared to the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, but the restrictions introduced in this period were not taken back either. 
Many things that happened in the previous government period have not been taken back. (...) 
For example, the zones between demonstrations have become larger. That you have to regis-
ter two days in advance, not 24 hours in advance. (...) And this can also be used tactically to 
undermine certain demonstration freedoms. I 21 
3.3.1. Human rights and the Covid-19 Pandemic 
Developments in human rights since 2019 have been influenced mainly by the Covid-19 crisis. There 
have been measures affecting various aspects of human rights, such as curfews and other restrictions 
of movement. They affected the freedom of religion, of assembly, of access to education and employ-
ment, the rights of immigrants and others.  
In general, the state is obliged to contain the pandemic; it must protect the right to life and health. 
Measures to this end must be necessary and appropriate. In order to protect human rights in the pro-
cess, the measures must be clearly regulated by law, i.e. they must not – as has happened in some cases 
– be imposed by decree (Amnesty_International, 2020). Particularly sensitive were exit restrictions, 
whose legal coverage was doubted by constitutional and human rights experts.15 
According to a report by Amnesty International Austria, drastic measures at the beginning of the pan-
demic were justified due to a lack of information, but later decrees restricting freedom of movement 
and contact are often described as non-transparent. Some of them could not be upheld by the Consti-
tutional Court, and some were formulated in a way that was misleading, so that there was insufficient 
legal certainty. The high discretionary powers of the police in this context were also criticised. 
 
14 https://www.amnesty.at/presse/upr-amnesty-fordert-konsequentere-menschenrechtspolitik-in-oesterreich/ (22 February 
2021) 
15 https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000116320262/was-genau-ist-nun-erlaubt?ref=article (7 April 2020) 
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In fact, many measures and specifications to restrict the pandemic were overturned by the Constitu-
tional Court. Some were therefore too vague16 or for other reasons unlawful.17 
3.3.2. Freedom of association 
There have been no significant changes with regard to freedom of association. It is well established in 
law and implemented in practice. A bureaucratic but neither obstructive nor restrictive legal framework 
exists.  
With regard to the legal protection of political freedoms and political participation, §278 of the Penal 
Code, the so-called terrorism paragraph, is still questionable. The offence of a criminal (terrorist) organ-
isation is formulated too broadly. Further, it is worrying that members of organisations designated as 
criminal can also be investigated preventively.18 
3.3.3. Freedom of assembly 
Freedom of assembly in Austria is well regulated by law. In 2017, however, some changes led to re-
strictions. The legal framework for spontaneous assemblies and counter-assemblies has deteriorated. 
The notification period for assemblies was increased from 24 to 48 hours. In addition, the possibility of 
prohibiting assemblies that serve other countries has been extended. There is a lot of room for interpre-
tation here, which increases the possibility of arbitrary state action.19 
Further, protected areas for parallel assemblies have been identified. Amnesty International Austria sug-
gested in its statement to refrain from a general minimum protection area and to establish protection 
areas only if necessary. Otherwise, assemblies could be prevented by the reporting of sham assem-
blies.20 
Demonstrations and bans on demonstrations in times of pandemic 
A sensitive issue in the face of contact restrictions due to Covid regulations are demonstrations. On the 
one hand, it is important that people can express their opinions or protest publicly. On the other hand, 
large gatherings of people can pose risks of infection.  
 
16 https://richtervereinigung.at/novelle-epidemiegesetz-covid-19-massnahmengesetz/ (9 January 2021) 
17 https://www.vfgh.gv.at/rechtsprechung/Ausgewaehlte_Entscheidungen.de.html (10 March 2021) 
18http://www.amnesty.at/service_links/presse/pressemitteilungen/amnesty_international_und_greenpeace_fordern_re-
form_des_mafiaparagraphen_278a/ (6 May 2014) 
19 https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SN/SN_00481/imfname_628592.pdf (11 January 2019) 
20 https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/SN/SN_00481/imfname_628592.pdf (11 January 2019) 
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The handling of demonstrations during the pandemic in Austria was very multi-faceted and also 
strongly criticised. During the pandemic, several demonstrations were banned, but in some cases they 
did take place without permission. 
Amnesty International Austria criticized that it was not always comprehensible why some demonstra-
tions were banned or restricted and others not. Thus, every intervention in the freedom of assembly 
needs a differentiated and transparent justification in each individual case. This must be clearly com-
municated in advance.21 
In some cases, very restrictive measures were taken: In April 2020, for example, a demonstration by the 
Austrian Students' Union with four people was banned, although they had agreed to keep a minimum 
distance of two metres and to wear mouth and nose protection. The organisers argued in a press release 
that this action was to be understood as a direct violation of fundamental democratic rights. While work 
continued to take place in confined spaces such as factories, it thus was incomprehensible why basic 
rights, such as a right to assemble, were dismissed.22 Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, this 
highly restrictive approach was lifted again and assemblies were permitted. 
At the beginning of the first lockdown, it was not at all clear how the police would deal with 
assemblies. This was only debated in the course of the summer that the right of assembly must 
at least be weighed against the public good. I 7 
With COVID, we have of course experienced that freedom of assembly is once again restricted, 
for understandable reasons. But there are also examples that we have heard that cannot be 
justified by COVID. So there was a ban on a demonstration, on a procession in Linz, they said 
that they were allowed to stand where they wanted, but they were not allowed to walk, (...) 
that is not in line with the law, if you simply relate it to COVID. I 12 
In spring, one could get the impression that the police were prohibiting any form of demon-
stration (...) then it became increasingly clear that the freedom of assembly was not com-
pletely suspended. I 7  
In general, there were high hurdles to organising pandemic-compliant assemblies. 
Taking to the streets with thousands of people has become extremely difficult. I 16 
 
21 https://www.amnesty.at/presse/amnesty-fordert-klare-kriterien-und-einzelfallentscheidung-bei-demo-verboten/ (22 Feb-
ruary 2021) 
22 https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20200409_OTS0018/oeh-uni-wien-wirtschaftsinteressen-nicht-vor-
grundrechte-stellen (11 January 2019) 
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Later, a number of assemblies took place, initially usually without major problems. Examples were the 
solidarity action with Black Lives Matter, environmental rallies or demonstrations for the right to asylum 
or the evacuation of asylum camps on the Greek islands. They all took place in strict compliance with 
Covid measures. 
I think that the Fridays really do behave extremely exemplary (...). They only demonstrate with 
masks. And they are also very, very careful about what they call for. I 21 
In contrast, many of the so-called anti-Corona demonstrations deliberately did not consistently adhere 
to the measures against the spread of the pandemic, leading to discussions about the scope of freedom 
of assembly. 
Now that the opponents of the Corona measures are committing such massive administrative 
offences at rallies (...) for the first time there is a real consideration to actually prohibit and 
dissolve rallies. I 7 
In the spring of 2021, there were many large demonstrations against the government's measures. Many 
of them had been banned for health reasons, but nevertheless took place, with several thousand par-
ticipants. Right-wing radicals and hooligans were also present, many participants violated the obliga-
tion to wear masks and keep their distance, and there were frequent violent riots.  
(...) where the demonstrations were actually prolonged and carried out in an undirected, un-
controlled manner until late in the evening, due to the ban and the evasion in the direction of 
a walk. I 22 
Since the end of December 2020, a total of 673 Corona-related assemblies have been registered across 
Austria, according to statistics from the Ministry of the Interior. Of these, 113 were not registered, 75 were 
prohibited. During the demonstrations, 7,175 charges were filed under administrative law. In total, 
around 85,000 people took part.23 
In March, for example, about 10,000 people demonstrated in Vienna despite a ban on the event. The 
atmosphere was described as aggressive, with conspiracy theorists and right-wing extremists taking 
part, including identitarians and even the convicted neo-Nazi Gottfried Küssel. In addition to anti-Se-
mitic slogans, the propaganda of the “fake news press” was also denounced.24 Despite travel 
 
23 https://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/corona-demos-in-wien-gestartet/401209981 (6 March 2021) 
24 https://www.diepresse.com/5947325/anti-corona-demos-in-wien-anzeigen-aggressive-stimmung-rechtsextreme-
mitmarschierer (22 March 2021) 
 43 
restrictions, demonstrators had been brought in coaches from other federal states. Further, distance 
rules and the obligation to wear masks were often not respected. 
The impression that demonstrations of different political provenance were treated differently by the 
police was widely shared. According to this, demonstrations by the left were generally dealt with more 
harshly. 
There was widespread criticism that the police acted with too much restraint during the violent demon-
strations of the Corona deniers. According to video sequences published on Twitter, police officers al-
legedly let the sometimes aggressive demonstrators go ahead and right-wing extremists marched side 
by side with the police 25 
During the same period, for example, a demonstration against deportations of asylum seekers took 
place, where the police had been disproportionately harsh against peaceful demonstrators, serious al-
legations of violations of the protesters' fundamental and human rights accumulated, through tear gas, 
detentions without the possibility of telephone calls and the right to contact lawyers. Demonstrators 
had to undress in front of – not always same-sex – officers.26 
And at the same time, when we experienced Innsbruck, (that the) executive intervenes and 
specifically encircles a part and then proceeds with brutality and pepper spray against the 
demonstrators (...) the difference between what happened in Vienna and what happened in 
Innsbruck (...) is worrying. I 22 
The police's harsh handling of protests by students against the deportation of two Georgian girls who 
had grown up in Austria was also criticised. The police used dogs and sharp weapons.  
The impression was widely shared that double standards were applied here, among others by the Sec-
retary General of Amnesty International Austria.27 
The cancellations of the demonstrations of the so-called Corona deniers also affect other demonstra-
tions, as demonstrations that accept the measures were also regularly banned. 
 
25 https://www.salzburg24.at/news/oesterreich/wien-umstrittener-polizeieinsatz-bei-corona-demo-evaluiert-98565853 (20 
January 2021); https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000124163685/rund-1-600-anzeigen-nach-corona-demo-am-samstag-in 
(14 February 2021) 
26 https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000123858624/schwere-vorwuerfe-nach-polizeieinsatz-bei-innsbrucker-demo (24 Feb-
ruary 2021) 
27 https://www.diepresse.com/5931847/corona-demo-am-sonntag-unschoner-eindruck-der-polizei (5 February 2021) 
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(…) it is frightening how the right to demonstrate is now being dealt with (...) they have forbid-
den us (...) because of (...) these Corona deniers' demonstrations. (...) Now, of course, it's pan-
demic, we have to be careful, at the same time it's a deep cut into freedom of assembly. I 22 
3.3.4. Freedom of expression 
In the context of civic spaces, it is also interesting to note that in January 2021, the government an-
nounced multiple and general charges against those persons who accused the Minister of Finance of 
accepting donations or corruption.  
One example that became prominent was the announcement that the Ministry of the Interior was con-
sidering legal action against a private person because of a tweet insulting the police. This was notable 
not only because the announcement was published on the ministry's official website, but also because 
the person was named there by full name. Legal experts assured that the citizen's statement in question 
had no relevance under criminal or administrative law. It was argued that it was a clear political intimi-
dation attempt, which could have “chilling effects”, namely that people start to censor themselves out 
of fear.28 Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention on freedom of expression explicitly states that state-
ments can also offend, shock or disturb. Amnesty International Austria accordingly described the an-
nouncement in a tweet as an attempt of intimidation. Apart from that, no restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression were reported. 
3.3.5. Restriction of the rights of residents of nursing homes and care facilities and self-advocacy 
As a representative example of other areas where restrictions on general rights have been imposed for 
health reasons, the following section discusses restrictions on residents of nursing homes and care fa-
cilities.  
Due to the fear of infection, fundamental rights are restricted to a particularly high degree in this area, 
such as the right to free movement and visitation.29 Dealing with the pandemic poses considerable chal-




ein (22 February 2021) 
29 Cf. Provincial Law Gazette for Vienna (2020). 18. Ordinance on the prohibition of entry by visitors to hospitals, residential 
and nursing homes and nursing wards.  
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/LgblAuth/LGBLA_WI_20200414_18/LGBLA_WI_20200414_18.html (22 February 2021); 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT FÜR DIE REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH (2020). 463rd Covid-19 Protective Measures Ordinance – COVID-19-
SchuMaV, 1.11.2020. https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2020_II_463/BGBLA_2020_II_463.html (4 March 
2021) 
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Representatives of the providers were surprised at the cooperation and efforts of the clients to cope 
with the situation in spring 2020, as the statement of a representative of a disability organisation shows: 
What was extremely impressive for me was the behaviour of the clients, the people with disa-
bilities. (...) they make such an effort to adhere to the COVID rules. I 25 
However, the legal requirements also lead unintentionally and over the course of the year to consider-
able side effects, such as the reduction of direct contacts.  
That makes a difference, the loss of a social network, that the relatives no longer visit or visit 
very, very little. I 26 
The bans on visits lead to an increase in loneliness and isolation for many residents and for some also 
to the loss of stabilising structures. The experience of how quickly the rights of freedom were restricted, 
caused some representatives to reflect: 
(...) that one has definitely dealt with the personal rights of people, whether it is okay to lock 
these people away and has also perhaps thought about it in a broader framework: What is 
happening there? I 27 
The scientific board of the evaluation report on the National Action Plan on Disability also concludes 
that the participation of persons with disabilities decreased significantly in 2020 and that exclusion phe-
nomena occurred. The authors express the fear: that the measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic 
isolate many people with disabilities and thus also have a negative impact on efforts towards inclusion. 
The crisis thus risks invalidating developments of recent years (BMSG, 2020). 
Self-advocacy 
Further, self-representation is relevant with regard to persons with disabilities. The UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities30, ratified by Austria, increases the pressure to expand independ-
ent advocacy. It obligates public authorities to develop and implement legislation and policies that en-
able the close consultation and active involvement of persons with disabilities, including children with 
disabilities, through their representative organizations (BMSG, 2020). 
 
30 Federal Law Gazette for the Republic of Austria (2016). 105th Announcement: Correction of the German-language transla-
tion of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. https://www.monitoringausschuss.at/download/grundlagen/un-konven-
tion/BGBl_III_105_2016.pdf (4 March 2021) 
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While some interest groups31 have already been active for years in some federal provinces and there is 
already lived practice of political participation, other federal provinces still have a need for action. There 
are certainly positive examples of successful political participation that can be understood as proto-
types for further processes, such as the approach taken in drafting the Adult Protection Act. At the same 
time, the report published by the Monitoring Committee in December 2020 shows many failures by the 
public authorities.32 
It is remarkable that, despite the pandemic, Fonds Soziales Wien is pursuing an innovative process of 
electing self-advocates on its own behalf and thus meeting the demand for a deepening of political par-
ticipation by establishing an FSW client council33:  
This has just been established these days, after a very good election procedure, very partici-
patory and low-threshold, with broad participation. So, if you look at it from this point of view, 
the development in the last two years is quite positive. So, self-advocates are not only heard, 
but they also really get a role, they can participate. I mean, whether they really have a say re-
mains to be seen, but they now have a body and they have a voice. I 8 
At the same time, however, it is also criticised that a differentiated understanding of different types of 
disability cannot be captured by only one self-representation body in its full heterogeneity. 
3.4. Financial resources  
When it comes to funding, CSOs are very different from for-profit organisations. CSOs pursue non-profit 
objectives and are not entitled to distribute generated surpluses to owners. In general, CSOs in Austria 
have good access to financing, but there are difficulties in raising external capital. Another limitation 
concerns liquidity and the investment of financial resources. Especially CSOs financed by donations are 
subject to certain limits, as risky forms of investment can hardly be justified to donors. In Austria, the 
public sector plays a decisive role in the financing of CSOs. In the long-term development of funding, 
slightly more than half of the total income of non-profit organisations has always been provided by the 
federal government, the provinces or the municipalities (Pennerstorfer et al., 2013). 
Basically, there are two different ways in which the public sector acts as a buyer of services (Anastasiadis 
et al., 2003): 
 
31 An example of this is the Association of Interest Groups of People with Disabilities in Upper Austria, which has a long tradi-
tion of participation in the creation of equal opportunities programmes (https://www.ivooe.at/). 
32 Shadow report of the monitoring bodies of Austria on the List of Issues on the occasion of the upcoming State Review by 
the UN Committee of Experts (2020). https://www.monitoringausschuss.at/menschen-mit-behinderungen-aktueller-
schattenbericht-zeigt-dringenden-handlungsbedarf/ (4 March 2021) 
33 https://kundinnenrat.fsw.at/fsw-kundinnen-rat/ (3 March 2021) 
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1. Service contracts34: clearly defined services are commissioned here. The legal basis for this is 
public procurement law. 
2. Subsidies35: Subjects of subsidies can be projects, infrastructure costs, etc. The level of detail of 
what is funded varies greatly. There are subsidies through official decisions (sovereign admin-
istration) and subsidy contracts (private sector administration). The legal basis for this is admin-
istrative law, budgetary law, civil law and EU funding directives.  
For years, performance contracts have increasingly been awarded in order to strengthen competition 
within the framework of allocation procedures (Meyer & Simsa, 2013a).  
3.4.1. Development of public funding for non-profit organisations 
In the last report on changes in civil society framework conditions, the influence of the then ÖVP-FPÖ 
government on public funding could be clearly observed in Austria. Certain areas of activity experienced 
politically motivated cuts that often threatened the existence of CSOs (Simsa et al. 2019). In this regard, 
in 2020 some improvements were observed among respondents. In particular, surprising cuts during 
the funding period have no longer occurred. 
The last time [note: under the ÖVP-FPÖ government] it was the case that there were really, for 
example, massive cuts at the funding level. In the middle of the year we found out that our 
informally promised funding for the current year would be cut by 50 percent. So, we are not 
experiencing such things now. I 19 
And this situation, where associations are now threatened in their existence due to unex-
pected cuts in public funding, is something I would not have heard about in the last two years. 
I 14 
In some cases, this was also explained by better contacts of the CSOs and corresponding interest groups 
to the respective ministries, especially those held by the Greens. In general, funding concerns of civil 
society would again meet with more resonance among politicians. However, the majority of respond-
ents emphasised that despite a more secure funding period, hardly any absolute increase in funding 
could be observed. Contrary developments could only be noted in one case at the state level. In addi-
tion, many areas of civil society were still underfunded (e.g. women's sector). However, interviewees did 
not identify any political strategy to “starve” specific areas of funding (I 4). 
 
34 The term performance contract is not clearly defined – Neumayr (2010) for example, refers to grants with a high level of de-
tail as performance contracts as well. 
35 The term promotion is not clearly defined and there are many other terms, such as aid and subsidies (Neumayr, 2010).  
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(...) women's organisations in particular urgently need (...) support, not only for their internal 
business, but also for the umbrella organisations of women's organisations, which need mas-
sive amounts of money. In order to work structurally. To work systemically with the public 
sector, with administration and government. That is far too little. I 24 
Many respondents also criticised the fact that funding commitments in 2020 were still only issued in the 
middle or second half of the year, which had a negative impact on planning security. Accordingly, the 
planning perspective and financial security had not improved under the current government.  
And I think it can't get much worse than getting funding commitments in the middle of the 
year or in the second half of the year. Because that simply makes continuous operation very 
difficult. I 19 
From personal experience, it has become more difficult. But that was a result of the ÖVP-FPÖ 
government, when our funding period was halved. This means that the planning perspective 
and financial security have been reduced accordingly, with much more effort and expense, 
always with regard to new calculations and uncertainties for all those who are involved. This 
has not changed under the People’s Party-Green government. So this has been taken over and 
continued. I 18 
Others, however, say that under the new government, commitments were made earlier and liquidity 
problems could thus be avoided. 
Some representatives of the CSOs expressed increased uncertainty about the current funding situation. 
The fear relates to the effects of the COVID-19 situation on the future allocation of funding.  
The general fear, however, is very much that we are now in a situation where we say, well, last 
year fewer funds were needed because of Corona. We assume that, given the situation (...) de 
facto cuts will happen. I18 
It is not clear to anyone how this will actually be financed in the future. That's why there is still 
a real fear of the next austerity package or cutback package. I 21 
Nationalisation of legal advice 
For many respondents, the establishment of the Federal Agency for Care and Support Services (BBU) 
also brought significant financial cuts. Since 1 January 2021, the BBU has been responsible for legal 
counselling and return counselling for asylum seekers, and since 1 December 2020, for basic services at 
the federal level (Menschenwürde Österreich 2021). As a state legal counselling service, it takes over 
 49 
tasks that were previously carried out by some CSOs, which is why a large part of the public funding for 
these organisations has now ceased.  
(...) the legal counselling (...) and this whole counselling issue has moved away from us. In this 
respect it [note: the public funding] is actually less. (...) not because the government is giving 
us less money now. But because a service has simply ceased to exist as part of our tasks. I 5 
Reactions to this varied among the interviewees. On the one hand, the discontinuation of these services 
meant that state funding was no longer necessary, on the other hand, some regarded this nationalisa-
tion as a “red line” (I22) that had been crossed, since both the decress on which the the counselling was 
based and the legal counselling itself were now carried out by the same ministry. 
3.4.2. NPO support fund  
Probably the biggest change in funding policy for most NPOs in 2020 was the establishment of the “Non-
Profit Organisation Support Fund”, which amounts to 700 million euros. The aim of the funding is to 
enable NPOs to continue their work in civil society despite the current Corona crisis and the accompa-
nying uncertainty of funding. As of the writing of this report, 19 000 applications have been accepted, 
with a total of 341 million euros distributed. In each case, the income of the corresponding quarter from 
the previous year was taken into account. The relevant monetary losses due to the pandemic regula-
tions were compensated by the fund. According to the law (§1 para 2 of the Federal Law on the Estab-
lishment of an NPO Support Fund), the following organisations are entitled to receive money from the 
fund: 
• If charitable, benevolent or ecclesiastical purposes are pursued. 
• When tasks are performed that would otherwise be the responsibility of the fire brigade. 
• State-recognised religious communities and churches.  
Political parties, organisations that are at least half owned by the federal government, the provinces or 
the municipalities and actors in the financial sector, as well as generally profit-oriented companies, were 
exempt from the above-mentioned requirements. In order to receive support, an application must be 
submitted to the Federal Ministry of Arts, Culture, Civil Service and Sport (BMKOES). The support fund 
has been extended again and includes a so-called “NPO lockdown grant” which is intended to support 
non-profit associations that are additionally burdened by the lockdown measures (e.g. hospitality in-
dustry and accommodation, closure of sports facilities) (BMLRT, 2020). 
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Reception within the organised civil society: 
The establishment of the relief fund was viewed very positively by most respondents. This was a clear 
step in a promising direction. There has been closer cooperation between politics and CSOs, as they 
have been involved in the planning of the fund itself (I 24). In particular, the Interessenvertretung Ge-
meinnütziger Organisationen (IGO) and the Bündnis für Gemeinnützigkeit, an alliance of Austria-wide 
associations and networks of civil society, were strongly involved in the negotiations. There has also 
been great interest from other countries in how the fund is structured and how the allocation of funds 
works. This shows that a certain pioneering role is being taken here, which meets with international 
recognition. 
(...) that it was set up, that's extraordinary. So that, to a certain extent, we are pioneers (...) I 14 
It would probably have been a (...) bad year if we hadn't had this NPO support fund. I 21 
Most of the criticism was directed at the bureaucracy associated with the fund. For example, an almost 
unmanageable amount of payment receipts had to be submitted (I 3), which made the general act of 
applying very time-consuming and lengthy. However, most of the grants were paid out afterwards with-
out any further problems (I 21).  
A veritable jungle has emerged. Not only through the various funds, but also through the many 
revisions and re-creations of the guidelines that were the subject of the individual funding 
pools. So we still have our hands full with advising where one could go at all, if one needs 
support. I 18 
These bureaucratic hurdles have already been communicated in public statements. Among respond-
ents the predominantly positive feedback was underlined, however, especially for larger NPOs, the ac-
counting necessary for the application states exhaustive requirements. In addition, the serious situation 
of non-profit organisations that are not eligible and thus cannot compensate for their crisis-related 
problems is also complained about. It is imperative that improvements are made. (Neunteufel 2020) 
Another point of criticism, which was not often mentioned, but which has serious consequences for the 
arts and culture sector, is the funding of small artists. Among this group of people, those who were al-
ready living in a precarious situation before the pandemic were particularly threatened. 
The crisis does not compensate for this, but actually exacerbates these inequalities. A very 
striking example is that in the quasi, which one do you take now, in the fund that is meant for 
artists, you get at least a thousand euros a month if you can live on it, yes? However, those 
who were already precarious receive no less than three hundred euros a month. And it's 
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obvious that you can't live on that. And then you hear cynical remarks from politicians, saying 
that no one should get rich from the crisis. They already had very little before. I 18 
The difference in treatment here is usually between actors who are structured as classic, commercial 
organisations and those who are non-profit oriented. In the case of the latter, it is probably assumed 
from the outset that they are mainly supported by volunteers anyway, which means that (additional) 
funding is not necessary (I 18). 
3.4.3. Donations 
The report of the Fundraising Verband Austria (Austrian Fundraising Association) for the year 2020 shows 
significant developments in national donations. In 2020, the country's donations amounted to about € 
750 million and thus showed an increase of € 25 million (about 3.5%) compared to the previous year 
(Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020). The increase in donations follows the trend of recent years, with 
universities and federal museums in particular among the winners.  
Especially the introduction of donation deductibility in 2009, the steady growth of fundraising organisa-
tions and the professionalisation of fundraising in various NPOs are seen as causes for this increase 
(Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020). In an international comparison, the stability of Austrian donation 
participation and the increase in the average donation per donor is remarkable, which runs counter to 
the global trend. In 2020, donations in the form of wills in Austria increased by 17% compared to the 
previous year and are thus in line with the international trend (Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020). An 
increase can also be observed in the area of charitable foundation donations, which are considered an 
indication of the internationalisation of the NPO sector (Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020).  
Furthermore, a change in the most important donation purposes during the pandemic could be ob-
served. Above all, organisations and initiatives from the health, care and social sectors were supported, 
followed by animal welfare and international aid campaigns (Meyer & Terzieva, 2020).  
Last year, the number of donors aged 16 and over in Austria rose by 9%, reaching 73% of the population. 
Not only did the number of donors and the total volume of donations reach record levels, but for the 
first time the average donation of women (125 €) exceeded that of men (123 €). The age group of 35 to 
59-year-olds recorded the highest average value (144 €). The provinces with the highest donations were 
Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg with an average of 146 € per donor. Styria and Carinthia brought up the 
rear in the comparison of the federal states. A significant development over the last 20 years has been 
the continuous increase in the number of Austrians who donate a fixed amount to charity. In contrast, 
the number of situational donors has decreased (currently about 50%). On the other hand, in Vienna, 
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Carinthia and Styria, donations are made frequently for specific occasions (Fundraising_Verband_ 
Austria, 2020). 
Changes in donation behaviour due to COVID-19  
The outbreak of the Corona pandemic was a decisive influencing factor in the general development of 
donation behaviour in 2020. A recent survey conducted from July to August 2020 concluded that the 
donation behaviour of a large part of the population (71%) has not changed as a result of the crisis 
(Meyer & Terzieva, 2020). Accordingly, this group either continued not to donate or did not change the 
extent and/or their frequency of giving. 10% of respondents said they donated less than in the previous 
year and 9% said they would donate more now (Meyer & Terzieva, 2020). Accordingly, despite initial 
difficulties due to lockdown and “physical distancing”, donation behaviour has remained largely un-
changed. This observation from the data was mostly confirmed by the interview partners. Thus, the ini-
tially feared collapse of donations and funding did not occur. The loyalty of donors and new forms of 
digital fundraising were emphasised by many. 
And now it is stable. And that's why I also said we have very loyal supporters. I 6 
People see that the work we do is meaningful and are willing to support it financially. So we 
don't see any effects at all at the moment. I 16 
This contrasts with the results of another study (n=99) by Millner and colleagues (2020), who asked the 
CSOs themselves about their donations from the beginning of the crisis until August 2020. Here, a some-
what different picture emerges, as 39% of the social organisations surveyed state that the crisis has had 
a negative impact on donations (Millner et al., 2020). Although the majority (55%) of the organisations 
surveyed state that donations received have not changed as a result of the pandemic (Millner et al., 
2020), there is a certain discrepancy here with the observations of the donors themselves and the find-
ings of the fundraising association. These differences could be explained, among other things, by the 
fact that the main survey by Milner and colleagues took place at the beginning of the crisis, when people 
had not yet switched to other forms of giving. For this reason, we will refer to the data of the Fundraising 
Association in our discussion, as these are the most up-to-date and are based on the largest data base. 
Furthermore, it can be stated that about 33% of Austrians have donated since the outbreak of COVID-
19, which at first glance seems to be a decrease compared to the 46% of the previous year (Meyer & 
Terzieva, 2020). There may be different reasons for this. Many people donate via standing order, which 
is debited at the beginning of the year for most donation subscriptions. It could therefore be that these 
 53 
donors did not donate again after the outbreak of the pandemic. Of course, the current economic situ-
ation may also play a role in this change, as many people are now in a precarious financial situation. 
However, some respondents also reported a greater willingness to donate and an increased sense of 
social responsibility among private individuals, but also companies. 
But this “Shit, something really big has happened now. Where a lot of people can really be 
affected by it.” I think that has occurred to a lot of people. And we see that both in the dona-
tions, where we see that the willingness to donate is very high among those we can pick up. 
At the moment we are collecting more donations than we normally do. But it has to be said 
that at the same time certain donation channels have closed this year. I 5 
Well, we have also seen that many companies have become aware of their social responsibility 
to a certain extent. It was really exciting to see that companies argued and said that we were 
lucky. We have come through the crisis well. We are just the ones who are not so affected. And 
that's why we now want to do this and that. I 5 
An interesting development perceived by one of the interviewees is that after the publication of the so-
called “Ibiza video” (resulting in the end of the coalition between Austria’s People’s Party and the Free-
dom Party), there was a clearer drop in donations than due to the pandemic. This development was 
attributed to the fact that for some donors, the dismissal of the last government was equated with an 
improvement in the civil society situation, making possible donations superfluous. 
(...) there is a break to Ibiza. And the donations have decreased (...) because the danger has 
been averted, so to speak. (...) So until then there was a peak and then it just clearly went 
down. I 6 
Furthermore, the survey by Meyer and Terzieva (2020) found that women's donations were lower during 
the pandemic (Meyer & Terzieva, 2020). However, this observation could not be confirmed by the results 
of the fundraising association. Such a development could, however, be due to the increased social ine-
quality caused by the Corona crisis.36 
The literature shows that the amount of donations is strongly related to the financial situation of the 
donors, as well as to lifestyle and education, the latter in turn correlating with financial capital (Neumayr 
& Schober, 2012). This was also evident in the donation behaviour during the pandemic. People who 
 
36 https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2020-12/soziale-ungerechtigkeit-pandemie-coronavirus-arbeit-gesundheitssytem-hilfspro-
gramm (30 December 2020) 
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stated that they were better off professionally as a result of the pandemic or the lockdown showed an 
increased willingness to donate (Meyer & Terzieva, 2020). 
However, donations are only one of many ways to behave in solidarity for the common good and civil 
society. In general, a higher level of prosocial behaviour can be observed among people from lower in-
come strata than among those from higher strata (Piff et al., 2010). It can therefore be assumed that they 
have practiced different prosocial behaviour during the pandemic, such as helping elderly people from 
the neighbourhood with their shopping or doing voluntary work. 
However, not only financial aspects are relevant for the willingness to donate. It is evident that more 
people donated who felt that the outbreak of COVID-19 had a negative impact on their health and gen-
eral personal situation, or who perceived the outbreak of the Corona crisis as (very) threatening (Meyer 
& Terzieva, 2020) The assumption here is that these people have seen through their own experiences 
how important an appropriate civil society support network is. This could be described by the “mortality 
salience” effect, which states that people who become aware of their own mortality tend to act more 
prosocially (Roberts & Maxfield, 2019). 
This concept was originally developed to explain the lower donation participation of younger people 
(Roberts & Maxfield, 2019) and can also have an application in this meaning for the current willingness 
to donate, as the survey by Meyer and Terzieva likewise found that there has been a decline in donations 
among people aged 31 to 45 (Meyer & Terzieva, 2020). As already noted in the “General developments”, 
this age category is a particularly important donor group. The change could possibly be related to the 
fact that older people tend to have more severe courses of disease with Covid-19 and younger people 
therefore saw less risk in the current pandemic. 
Many NPOs have switched to digital fundraising tools during the pandemic. This development was well 
received by donors. 37% have changed their remittances to online payments in the time since the out-
break (Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020). The increasing popularity of online giving has been accel-
erated by the current developments and it seems that this form of giving will become the most popular 
donation method in the future. Interestingly, average online payments are higher than those made of-
fline (Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020). However, with the discontinuation of street fundraising, this 
shift towards digital tools was foreseeable for many of the respondents. 
(...) because I am mainly financed by donations. And through Corona, after a short slump at 
the beginning of the Corona period, we have also been able to make a name for ourselves 
because we sent out topics that had been prepared for a long time and then didn't fit at all. 
That was a bit awkward at the beginning. Then it turned completely positive immediately 
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afterwards. So it was much better than before. In the first lockdown, people were totally willing 
to donate because of the solidarity effect. And now it's at the same level as planned, and there-
fore also as in the other years. I 8 
(...) So the decline was in fundraising on the street, for example, we could no longer advertise 
on the street and (from) door to door. But we did much better digitally. So last year we had 
already put our money on it, yes, on online and were in the starting blocks and COVID practi-
cally gave us a boost. Just at the right time. So I think those who were able to ride this wave, 
there were some, I think, who benefited from it. I 12 
The overall increase in donations (Fundraising_Verband_Austria, 2020) during a crisis is a surprising turn 
of events in a year that is more likely to be remembered for negative events. Some of the interviewees 
also perceived an increase in donations as a surprising and positive expression of solidarity from donors, 
despite an initially feared slump.  
3.5. Impact on civil society and strategies 
3.5.1. Cooperation within civil society 
An important development during the ÖVP-FPÖ government was the increasing cooperation of various 
CSOs across various sectors. This resulted from the need for mutual support in a situation that was ex-
perienced as extremely difficult, as well as from the shared perception of the government as an enemy.  
Interestingly, many respondents report that this cooperation has not become less under the new gov-
ernment.  
What was actually positive under the ÖVP-FPÖ government at that time was the coming to-
gether of civil society. What I experienced very, very positively back then (...). It has become a 
bit looser again, but nevertheless the contacts from back then have remained and are very 
positive. So I think that the efforts to finally put this alliance, this representation of the interests 
of civil society, on a well-structured and, above all, well-financed footing, is about time and 
highly necessary. I 12 
So it's not just, okay, we do a strike and then it's dead silence again, but they really network 
all the time. (...) The fact that youth organisations are now also part of it is already ongoing 
during the year, I think that's really cool. I 9 
There are many more joint appearances with civil society organisations. I 5 
 56 
Thus, cooperation has been maintained or even expanded. A major achievement of a coordinated, con-
certed approach was the inclusion of NPOs in the government's Corona Emergency Fund. For the first 
time ever, NPOs were officially defined as a relevant social actor or statistical group. 
Despite successful collaborations, the ubiquity of the pandemic in the public discourse also meant lim-
itations in for the initiatives’ effectiveness. 
Well, I have the feeling that we have set a lot in motion with Lesbos. Especially with our trip 
with Katharina Stemberger and the Courage Initiative. I mean, we have never had such a broad 
alliance, from all the Christian churches, so many mayors, even black ones and so on, so the 
protest has already become very, very broad. I have the impression that if COVID didn't exist, 
we would have achieved something. I 10 
The pandemic also had an indirectly limiting effect on the cooperation of civil society organisations, as 
many were strongly challenged in their internal organisation but also in relation to their field of activity, 
for example in labour market policy. However, some organisations took the opportunity caused by the 
Covid-19 restrictions specifically for internal organisational development. 
(...) we are also dealing a lot with ourselves at the moment, because we are also asking our-
selves the question: So, what is our role now? What is the next step? I 5 
Even though the pandemic has made cooperation more difficult in some cases, it is considered highly 
necessary. 
We need the alliances. Only then can we appear strong or be taken seriously at all. I 8 
3.5.2. Situation of workers and organisations under Covid-19 – The cost of resilience 
This section is about how staff and managers deal with the pandemic, what patterns of success become 
visible and what organisations can learn for the time after. One focus is the social and health sector.  
In summary, the employees and also the organisations showed a high level of adaptive resilience. Adap-
tive resilience is the ability of people, teams and organisations to cope well with adverse circumstances 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). This is illustrated below using three different phases of the pandemic. 
Start of the pandemic in spring 2020 – “We want to make it work”.  
With the first lockdown, procedures and processes in the organisations were adapted to the policy re-
quirements. The introduction of home offices, changes in team constellations and the adaptation of 
direct services for clients meant considerable interventions in the organisation and design of work in a 
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very short time. Some services were also discontinued or severely restricted in favour of hygiene 
measures.  
Well, I have never experienced such hard working hours. I like to work a lot, but it was too 
much for me, especially (...) because everything was new in the spring and everything was con-
stantly changing. Everything had to be approached three times (...). That didn't only affect me, 
it also affected my environment, of course, and it also affected everyone in the administration 
very strongly or even more strongly, because of short-time work stories and so on. (I 25) 
These adjustments were made possible by the staff's high degree of flexibility, independence, improvi-
sational skills under uncertain conditions and willingness to cooperate with each other.  
In most cases, a high presence of managers was emphasised, which was experienced as crucial and 
supportive. Through this presence, managers gave their employees support and orientation by provid-
ing relevant information and ensuring decisions were made. It is interesting that it was almost irrelevant 
whether this presence was physical or merely meant virtual availability and responsiveness to the con-
cerns of the employees.  
An important factor was mutual trust and cooperation.  
It was madness. It was unbelievable how the people stuck together in the crisis situation and 
how natural it was for 99.5% of the staff to give everything. (I 25) 
In the first phase, there was also a high level of understanding for the measures, as well as a high level 
of willingness on the part of the customers to support the measures.  
Dealing with emotions and expectations proved to be a particular challenge for all those involved. Staff 
and managers were not only extremely challenged on a professional level, but also personally and emo-
tionally. They had to deal with the fear of illness or the possibility of transmission or infection.  
In this situation of great uncertainty, a high level of emotional competence was necessary in order to be 
there for the fears and concerns of the clients despite their own consternation. The situation was aggra-
vated by the fact that fear was deliberately stirred up by politicians at the beginning of the pandemic. 
This in turn caused additional work in hospitals and nursing homes, from calming patients to treating 
panic attacks. 
Furthermore, staff members are continuously required to manage expectations in order to deal with the 
sometimes different or ambiguous expectations. Apart from their own expectations of themselves, they 
had to balance the demands of colleagues, professional standards, the private environment, clients and 
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their relatives, health authorities, donors and politicians. This caused a lot of stress, especially in the 
exceptional situation of the pandemic. 
Another aspect was the partial organisation of work via home office. For those companies that were not 
prepared, this was challenging. Many organisations went through a massive and rapid learning process 
in the spring, reorganising themselves and finding a way to deal with the technology. Positive experi-
ences with home office therefore predominated until the autumn. 
In the spring review, the majority felt positive and proud of the way the pandemic had been handled so 
far. Many were amazed at what had been possible in the spring.  
Because the burden was enormous, (...) those involved in the company really tried to do their 
best and that was mostly right. And the customers as stakeholders have contributed an in-
credible share to the fact that the employees can also do it, that we can do it. That, which was 
so surprising for me (...) “proud” is the wrong expression, but I am totally pleased. I 25 
These positive feelings and the joint effort to get through a crisis are known from disaster research 
(Kuntz, 2020). Success in adaptation thus supports the feeling of self-efficacy, which is a resource in 
dealing with uncertain situations. 
Rest in summer – Different ways of preparing for the further course of the crisis 
After the successful fight against the first wave, about half of the organisations investigated consciously 
made preparations for the autumn. Based on the experiences of the spring, evaluations were carried 
out, prototypes for new offers, such as digital counselling formats, were developed, or new rules and 
procedures were drafted, for example, how to react to suspicious health cases or arrange visits, etc. The 
organisations then came through the next phase strengthened.  
Other organisations lacked the necessary resources for these projects. For example, due to staff short-
ages, the crisis team in one care organisation was abolished in the summer and there was no time for 
feedback loops or the development of new strategies.  
Peak load in autumn/winter 2020  
In autumn, the number of cases and thus the workload in social and health care institutions increased 
drastically. Whereas in the spring many people still had the feeling that they had to run a short distance 
race, the burdens now took on the character of a marathon.  
The side effects of the pandemic measures became increasingly burdensome for clients and staff as well 
as for their family environment. In care facilities, for example, isolation, loneliness and suffering from the 
loss of daily structures, such as communal events, eating together, etc., increased. For many, they 
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triggered feelings of helplessness, powerlessness and other negative emotions. The suffering of the cli-
ents meant an additional burden for the staff. For many, the impression of “COVID above all” was rein-
forced.  
Employees miss face-to-face meetings and digital meetings are increasingly experienced as exhausting. 
In the opinion of many they lack social and informal elements. Self-management is also less successful.  
Shortly before Christmas, many stressful moments became visible and a not inconsiderable 
number of employees are on sick leave for a longer period of time (...). We are now in a phase 
where things are very tight in a few areas and where many employees are a bit tired and this 
high energy level that was there in the spring cannot be maintained at the moment. I 25 
The aid workers on the ground also experienced the further tightening of hygiene measures as increas-
ingly strenuous. In addition, the lines of conflict regarding Covid-19 became clearer in teams.  
Yes, I do believe that we have experienced a degree of alienation (...), where there was already 
closer cooperation before, there was also more contact at a distance than with the other col-
leagues. (...) So where I usually go, I now perhaps prefer to go much more and where there is 
less, I seek even less personal contact. I 27 
A stressful moment was reached when feelings of guilt and fear were given vent to: In autumn, when 
suspicions arose, more and more staff members asked themselves whether they had brought the virus 
into the organisation.  
Suddenly she was positive during the daily test, she was very young, she was still very inexpe-
rienced, she had no experience of crises, she really took it to heart and believed that she had 
done something wrong in there! I 26  
In residential institutions – unlike in society – death is not a taboo but a reality. The staff have developed 
various forms and rituals to deal with the death of people they have cared for, sometimes for years. 
However, when there are many deaths at the same time, there is not enough time to adequately organ-
ise farewells.  
(...) and the staff member had to struggle with that when suddenly out of 30 residents (...) 15 
who were still sitting outside (...) then died and that was often the case, too many in a row and 
coping with grief often went very badly because we were so stuck in the mode, we have to, we, 
we have Corona. I 26 
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The formation of infection clusters in different facilities posed immense challenges for the nursing staff. 
Respondents reported psychological strain on staff and increasing staff turnover as negative conse-
quences.  
(...) What irritated me was that many newcomers to the nursing profession stopped working 
after the pandemic in Northern Italy because they said they couldn't take it since it was so 
stressful and difficult for them. And what I am experiencing now is that there is a double bur-
den, on the one hand in organisations for the disabled or in care organisations or in hospitals, 
because all the people have already lost colleagues. I 2 
In nursing and care homes, the strains accumulated in autumn. The already long duration of the crisis, 
the increasing number of cases and the particularly high public perception (“we have to protect the 
nursing homes”) led to increasing stress for staff and managers. Many got into a maelstrom and ne-
glected their own emotion and expectation management, which led to exhaustion.  
Somehow with Corona you fall into a hamster wheel, (...) where you just kind of, like, function. 
I 26 
In view of these great burdens, the concern is formulated that the feelings of guilt, the confrontation 
with the negative effects for clients and the experience of many losses could lead to traumatisation with 
considerable long-term consequences. A study of nurses in Northern Italy points to the danger of sec-
ondary traumatisation in the nursing sector (Arpacioglu et al., 2020). The already existing staff shortage 
increases this danger. 
So there is an urgent need for support measures to deal with the overload of the pandemic in an appro-
priate organisational and personal way (Tomlin et al., 2020). 
 (...) that there is an urgent need for people to be supported now, because otherwise we will 
have the very big waves of exhaustion in about half a year! I 26 
Furthermore, measures are needed to increase the number of staff in the health and care sector. The 
Austrian Health and Nursing Association is also sounding the alarm about the chronic shortage of nurs-
ing staff and the strain on nursing staff.37 
There was a tendency for staff in those organisations that did not have time for reflection and conscious 
learning loops to prepare for the further course of the pandemic during the quieter period to be more 
stressed. It thus became clear that certain buffers of resources (organisational slack) are necessary to 
 
37 https://www.oegkv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Aktuell/ICN_UEbersetzung_Fact_sheet_2.pdf (5 March 2020) 
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deal with crises. Minute-by-minute planning of care work, detailed documentation requirements and 
too tight cost planning make it impossible to keep these necessary resources for unforeseen events and 
for peak loads. 
The pandemic acts as a burning glass and highlights what was already positive or negative. On the one 
hand, it shows that the social and health care organisations were able to deal with the pandemic flexibly 
and that the staff showed a high level of commitment. On the other hand, it shows that a lack of re-
sources can only be compensated to a limited extent by increased commitment and in the long run 
leads to considerable costs for the staff. Applause and praise (the well-known clapping from the balco-
nies) – although meant appreciatively – is not enough in the long run!  
3.5.3. Development of volunteering  
Many of civil society's proposals are reflected in the current government programme. This programme 
also dedicates a separate subchapter to voluntary work and civil society engagement. Projects include 
the creation of a seal of approval for voluntary work, the establishment of a service centre for volunteers 
and volunteer organisations, the evaluation of the Volunteer Act, recognition of non-profit status in the 
awarding of public contracts and an improvement in the provision of services for the common good (p. 
31).38 
These plans meet with the approval of many non-profit organisations. Many hope that more resources 
will be made available for voluntary organisations. It is expected that the Greens will change the image 
that is widespread among the government partner that there are no costs involved in voluntary work.  
This starts with the assumption that where it is non-profit, everything is done on a voluntary 
basis anyway. This simply ignores the fact that there is just as much professional work going 
on, but personnel costs are still not recognised anywhere in the non-profit sector. I 18 
However, due to the pandemic, this issue was also pushed into the background. The implementation of 
the government's plans regarding volunteering was postponed. 
So there are many things in there that would be good and important, but they simply don't 
have priority at the moment, because, yes, in the Ministry of Social Affairs [note: Ministry of 
Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection] they have other things to do than to try 
to (...) promote [note: voluntary work], but now it's about dealing with the crisis. I 14  
 
38 Government Programme 2020-2024. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Vertretungen/Bern/Dokumente/Re-
gierungsuebereinkommen_Kurzfassung.pdf (7 March 2021) 
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The pandemic also had a strong impact on the extent and types of volunteering carried out. A distinction 
is made between formal and informal volunteering. Informal volunteering is primarily understood as 
neighbourhood help. Formal volunteering refers to engagement within the framework of a civil society 
organisation.  
The pandemic leads to an increase in solidarity with creative initiatives at the beginning of the year and 
thus to more informal volunteering. Neighbourly help in the form of shopping activities for vulnerable 
people, shopping services in communities lacking supplies or even volunteer telephone hotlines were 
widespread. Ramos, Andrews and Stamm (2021)39 show in their representative survey on the Corona 
crisis that informal volunteering increased by the middle of the pandemic year. 
Formal volunteering decreased until the middle of the year compared to the previous year (Ramos et.al. 
2021). In total, about half of the Austrians volunteered during the pandemic, but half only once. 10% of 
the volunteers gave their time several times a week. Other surveys also show a slight decline in formal 
volunteering (Meyer et.al. 2021). 
In our sample, CSOs were affected very differently by developments in volunteering. The closures of 
cultural and recreational institutions, which are strongly supported by volunteer work, led to a reduction 
of volunteer work in the affected CSOs. The organisations shifted their activities to the digital space.  
This means that everything that concerns personal commitment or work with volunteers (...) 
has almost come to a standstill. For example, (...) the information stands that we have or the 
vigils were not possible at all in the beginning and are only possible to a very, very limited 
extent now. I 12 
Some respondents fear that participation through volunteering will be more difficult in the future, as 
many volunteers have been lost due to the Corona pandemic. 
(...) that there, of course, where a lot happens with volunteers in the common sense, who (...) 
support and help, this has completely broken down. That with Corona there was hardly any 
possibility to be active in this context (...). And at the moment there is the fear that we have 
lost the volunteers in the long run and that it will take a lot of energy to bring them back (...). I 
18 
 
39 Romualdo Ramos, Margaret Renn Andrews and Tanja Stamm (2020). Physical but not socially distanced: Volunteering in 
times of COVID-19. https://viecer.univie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog72/ (7 March 2021) 
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At the same time, interest in volunteering increased in other organisations at the beginning of the pan-
demic, so that these CSOs were even able to recruit new volunteers.  
(...) because a lot of people really came forward who wanted to do something. I mean, it was 
also the time. People were sitting around, not knowing what they could do. And there was the 
onslaught, so to speak, so we always have people who contact us, who want to volunteer, but 
the onslaught was almost unmanageable in some cases. Because then even we created digital 
volunteer programmes. I 5 
Quantitative surveys show a tendency for society to become less solidaristic as the pandemic pro-
gresses. “This finding is accompanied by increasing crisis fatigue, dissatisfaction with government 
measures, rising disenchantment with democracy and increasing psychological stress (...).”40 This, as 
well as other data on the development of solidarity41, suggests a trend towards a reduction in volunteer-
ing as the pandemic progresses.  
  
 
40 Kittel, Bernhard (2020). The Desolidarisation of Society: From the First to the Second Lockdown. https://viecer.uni-
vie.ac.at/en/projects-and-cooperations/austrian-corona-panel-project/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/corona-dy-
namiken11/ (7 March 2021) 
41 Julian Aichholzer and Patrick Rohs (2021). How far does solidarity go in the Corona crisis?, https://viecer.univie.ac.at/co-
rona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog101/ (7 March 2021) 
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